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I. INTRODUCTION
Latin America possesses the most important and fastest-growing tele-
communications market in the world. Although large US operators such as
AT&T and MCI, and other European operators such as Italy's STET, have
an important foothold in Latin America's telecommunications sector,
Telef6nica de Espafia S.A. ("Telef6nica") is, through its international
subsidiary, TISA, the most important strategic investor and leading
telecommunications provider in the region. A number of elements, such as
privatization and liberalization of Latin America's telecommunications
sector, internationalization of Multinational Telecommunications Operators
("MTOs"), Foreign Direct Investment ("FDI"), and international consortia,
are involved in this telecom cocktail between the Spanish operator and the
Latin American telecommunications sector. This article will discuss the
manner in which all these elements interact.
Section II outlines, mainly from the perspective of the countries
involved, the significance of the privatization process of the
telecommunications sector in Latin America, the reasons behind the need
for change, the general pattern used in this process, how investors were
lured, and most important results and features. The strategic choice of
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MTOs' internationalization is influenced not only by external opportunities
such as those offered by the privatization process in Latin America, but
also by MTOs' domestic, external and internal factors. As such, by
focusing on Telef6nica, Section I examines the process of
internationalization of European MTOs, analyzes factors contributing to
this process, examines what internationalization strategies are applied and
how these can be implemented. Having established the suitability of
MTOs' internationalization, Section IV analyzes factors such as country
risk, potential relevant market, legal and regulatory framework, and sector
and enterprise restructuring that have to be carefully assessed when
considering entering new markets. Inasmuch as most international alliances
in the telecommunications sector are carried out through international
consortia, Section V is devoted to an examination of the main
characteristics and elements involved in its formation, the factors to be
carefully addressed during the acquisition procedure, and the aspects that
are critical for a successful consortium. After examining the importance the
globalization process and open schemes of regional integration have had in
FDI flows toward Latin America's telecommunications sector, Section VI
explores Telef6nica's experiences regarding investment strategies and
trends in Latin American privatized telecommunications companies, and
draws a general framework of sector and country investment opportunities
for the future. Finally, Section VII, focusing on Telef6nica's experiences,
lays down the most significant factors to be considered for a successful and
profitable investment in the sector, and makes a link with Latin America's
energy sector, which, following to some extent the path set up by
telecommunications, can currently be described as a second wave of
flourishing investment prospects in the region.
II. PRIVATIZATION OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR IN LATIN
AMERICA: PAVING THE WAY FOR PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT
During the last several years, deregulation, privatization, liberalization,
and re-regulation of the telecommunications sector in Latin America' has
proved to be essential: (i) to attract the private sector and to exploit the
advantages that the dismantling of natural monopoly entails for society and
(ii) for the whole economic development of the region. In order to
understand the significance that the whole process entails for governments,
I Privatization may be an element of broader economic policy comprising deregulation and
liberalization with the emphasis generally as much on improving the efficiency of retained state-owned
enterprises as on efforts to divest. See CHARIES VUYSrEaJ, TECHNIQUES OF PRIVATIZATION OF STATE-
OWNED ENTERPRISES: METHODS AND IAlFEMENATION, 1-7 (World Bank Technical Paper No. 88, 1988)
[hereinafter VUYLSTEKE].
1998]
86 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:83
it is necessary to examine, first, the reasons behind privatization, then, the
manner in which the process took place and, finally, the most significant
results and major features.
A. The Rationale Behind Privatization
1. OVERCOMING SECTOR AND COMPANY FAILURES
It was not until the late-1980s that Latin America became the
developing world's laboratory for large-scale privatization in the
telecommunications sector. Prior to a period of privatization,
telecommunications monopolies2 traditionally owned and operated the
different national telecommunications networks.3 The reasons for state
control and ownership of telecommunications services included arguments
of natural monopoly, universal service, the potential to generate revenues,
and national security.4 However, a number of factors called into question
the deep state involvement in telecommunications. On the one hand, a
wide-spread inefficiency 5 was reflected by long waiting lists for telephone
Monopoly loosely refers to firms with high market power, not necessarily those with 100
percent of the market. Also, it covers both natural and artificial monopolies. For instance,
[in Latin America] state-owned telephone companies were sole providers of both local
and long-distance telephone services, the first of which is still widely regarded as a
natural monopoly, while the second is not... Thus, with long-distance service was no
longer [considered] a natural monopoly, given the advent of microwave and satellite
technology.
Ravi Ramamurti, The New Frontier of Privatization, in PRIVATIZING MONOPOLIES: LESSONS FROM THE
TiLOMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORT SECrORS IN LATIN AMERICA 1, 7-8 (1996) [hereinafter Rarnamurti
1].
3 Monopolies in local, national and international long-distance services were held, in Chile, by
Compafiia de Teldfonos de Chile ("CTC") and Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones ("ENTEL"); in
Argentina, by Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones ("ENTel"); in Mexico, by Teldfonos de Mexico
S.A. ('TELNEEX"); in Venezuela, by Compafiia An6nima Nacional de Teldfonos de Venezuela
("CANTV"); and in Peru, by Compaiiia Peruana de Tel~fonos ("CPT") and ENTEL
4 See WILIfAM W. AMBROSE, El'. AL., PRIVATIZING TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS: BUSINESS
OPPORTUNITIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 3, 3-4 (International Finance Corporation, Discussion Paper
No. 10, 1990) for a detailed analysis of these objectives of government ownership and control [hereinafter
AMBROSE, Er AL.].
5 Before privatization the picture was, in general, distressing. In Chile, service penetration was
low (about three telephone lines per 100 inhabitants), waiting lists for new lines reached 50% of the lines in
service, and due to the coexistence between old and new technologies, service innovation was rather small.
In Argentina, ENTel was in complete disarray with more than 8% of the 90% of all public network
subscribers out of service, 8.8 telephone lines per 100 inhabitants, almost endless waiting lists, a very low
quality of service (telephone calls were completed an estimated 49% for urban calls and 29% for long-
distance), management widely perceived as corrupt, and its 45,000 employees, most of whom were
SPANISH INVESTMENT STRATEGIES
services, poor service, infrastructure problems, underutilized capacity,
artificially low prices, and the capture of the firms by workers and unions;6
on the other hand, the economic foundation supporting state control of
telecommunications7 was being eroded as a result of rapid technological
changes, reduced production, installation and operation costs, and new
possibilities of providing services. As the structure of the sector could
neither respond efficiently to an increasing demand nor match the growing
needs emerging from a new information era, the failure of state-operated
enterprises to develop telecommunications networks which were able to
meet even the minimal needs of the public produced a shift in economic
and political reasoning that brought concern on governments to reform the
sector. The inadequate telecommunications structure was perceived as an
obstacle to economic and social development.
2. POLICY AND ECONOMIC REASONS
The impetus towards privatization cannot be explained solely upon the
grounds of sector and firm failure. There were also other factors beyond
sector or specific firm conditions such as the will to improve performance
of state firms by an improvement of regulation and management, a tougher
handling of labor issues, or less political interference. On the one hand, in
most of the countries privatization accelerated with the arrival of new and
more pragmatic administrations; 9 at the same time, there were also
unionized in state, on permanent strike. In Venezuela, although it was the fourth largest telecommunications
sector in Latin America, as much as 55% of basic demand was not met, eight lines per 100 inhabitants, and
waiting lists had an average of eight years. In Peru, waiting lists were three years and line density only 3%.
Conversely, in the case of Mexico, although performance also deteriorated (waiting lists of about three years
and service penetration still low), the picture was more optimistic for one reason: in comparison with the
other state-owned telecommunications companies, TELMEX was a fairly well-run company. See Carlos
Cassaus, Privatizations of Telecommunications: The Case of Mexico, in IMPLEMENTING REFORMS IN THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECrOR, 172 (Bj6m Wellenius and Peter A. Stem eds., 1996) [hereinafter
Cassaus]; Hector A. Mairal, The Argentine Telephone Privatization, in IMPLEMENTING REFORMS IN THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTroR, 161 (Bj6m Wellenius and Peter A. Stem eds., 1996) [hereinafter Mairal];
Jos6 Ricardo Melo, Liberalization and Privatization in Chile, in IMPLEMENTING REFORMS IN THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR, 146 (Bj6rn Wellenius and Peter A. Stem eds., 1996) [hereinafter Melo];
Aileen A. Pisciotta, Privatizations of Telecommunications: The Case of Venezuela in IMPLEMENTING
REFORMS IN THE TEECOMMUNICATIONS SECrOR, 187 (Bjorn Weenius and Peter A. Stem eds., 1996)
[hereinafter Pisciotta]
6 IMP EMENTING REFORMS IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECrOR, 1, 19-21 (Bj6m Wellenius
and Peter A. Stem eds., 1996).
7 See Ramamurti, supra note 2, at 6; see also AMBROSE ET AL., supra note 4, at 5, 13.
8 See Ramamurti, supra note 2, at 7 (Privatization "covers mainly the divestment of state-owned
enterprises... however, in the majority of cases, except in Chile, the government transferred management
control over the firm to private hands rather than merely selling a few shams to private parties").
9 For instance, in Argentina, with the advent of the Justicialista government of Carlos Menem, in
1998]
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international agencies such as the World Bank or the International
Monetary Fund ("IMF') pushing towards this direction. On the other hand,
privatization was also seen as a means of raising cash in order to reduce
budget deficits and public debts.1"
3. SENDING A SIGNAL TO INVESTORS
Privatization served not only to allow access to capital and
technological know-how," hence the focus on foreign telecommunications
companies as investors and also as operators, but also to send a positive
signal to local and foreign investors that governments were embarking on a
new economic strategy. For that, "the privatizers had to make sure that the
sale was a 'success."', 2  Therefore, not only did companies' candidates for
privatization have to be large, easily divested and attractive for foreign
investors, but also had to be sold in the first attempt to one of several
qualified bidders. Indeed, companies were desirable candidates for sale not
because their past performance might have been poor, as it was in some
cases, but because "their future growth and profit potential were
excellent."' 3
The manner in which these factors were balanced varied from one
privatization to another. In order to overcome a sector's and/or firm's
failure to improve and expand services, it was critical that incentives and
opportunities for private sector management be created for all, particularly
for Chile14 and Venezuela. 15 The use of sale proceeds to reduce fiscal
1989, the government launched a vast privatization program which included all the commercial activities
performed by the state such as telecommunications, electricity generation, water supply, gas, and
transportation. Willing to push Argentina towards a stronger economic development, five main reasons, that
can be applied in general to other countries, have been presented as Menem's ideas for privatization. Under
this scheme, privitization: (i) maximizes the use of public resources; (ii) brings a large inflow of capital into
the government; (iii) improves efficiency; (iv) stimulates investment and innovation; and (v) reduces
government involvement in the economy, thereby allowing a free market to flourish and a private sector to
develop. See Carla Davidovich, The Selling of Argentina: Is the Path to the First World Privatized?, 28
LAW & POL'Y ONT'L BUS. 151, at 151-65 (1996) [hereinafter Davidovich] for a discussion of these
economic and other social and political arguments.
10 Indeed, this was an important factor not only because of the cash raised, but also for the political
reason that a high selling price was presented to the public as a second-best solution counterbalancing the
internal pressures against giving away "national patrimony to private investors." See Ramamurti, supra note
2, at 11.
I Under a so-called "strategic partnership model," privatization aims at creating a modem
infrastructure development. See Bessel Kok, Privatization in Telecommunications-Empty Slogan or
Strategic Tool?, 16 TELECOMMUNICATIONS POL'Y 699, 702-03 (1992).
12 See Ramamurti, supra note 2, at 11.
13 Id. at 12.
14 See Melo, supra note 5, at 146-47.
15 See Pisciotta, supra note 5, at 187; see also Antonio Franc~s, A Planned Approach to
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deficit andpublic debt was an important motivation in Argentina,16 Mexico
and Peru. Mexico's goal was to "send a signal to local and foreign
investors [that it] was embarking on a new economic strategy."' 8
B. Setting the Pattern for Privatization
Although the countries and the conditions in and under which
companies were privatized are diverse, general patterns of similarity and
difference can be established.
1. PREPARING COMPANIES FOR PRIVATIZATION AND ATTRACTING
INVESTORS
Privatization not only means transferring ownership of state enterprises
to the private sector, but also involves the politically sensitive task of
freeing companies from the influence of beneficiaries, such as workers and
unions, ministers and legislators, and customers. In addition, it also
requires the technically complex tasks of restructuring a company, cleaning
up company finances, redefining its regulatory environment, and marketing
it to potential buyers. During this entire process, teams in charge of such
tasks received valuable technical assistance from international agencies
such as the World Bank, private consultants and financial advisers.
Although in most countries the general public's dissatisfaction with
state enterprises made it easier to gather support for privatization, worker
opposition proved to be a difficult problem to overcome in the case of
Argentina, where, before privatization, ENTel had an important unionized
workforce. In general, worker participation in company ownership under
favorable terms played an important role in reducing the workforce and
securing labor support for the reforms. 9 Willing to achieve the necessary
reforms as soon as possible, there was a general tendency to centralize the
privatization process and to minimize the involvement of the national
Telephone Privatization, in PRIVATIZING MONOPOLIES: LESSONS FROM THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND
TRANSPORT SECrORS IN LATIN AMERICA, 147, 168-71 (Ravi Raxnamurti ed., 1996) [hereinafter Francds].
16 See Ben Petrazzini, Telephone Privatization in a Hurry, in PRIVATIZING MONOPOLIES: LESSONS
FROM THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORT SECTORS IN LATIN AMERICA 118, 137 (Ravi
Ramamurti ed., 1996) [hereinafter Petrazzini].
17 Peter Hudson, Sell Now, Pay Later, BUS. LATIN AM., Mar. 25 1996, at 3.
18 Ravi Ramamurti, Telephone Privatization in a Large Country: Mexico, in PRIVATZING
MONOPOLIES: LESSONS FROM THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORT SECTORS IN LATIN AMERICA,
72, 101(1996) [hereinafter Ramamurti 2].
19 Bjom Wellenius, Telecommunications Restructuring in Latin America: An Overview in
IMPLEMENTING REFORMS IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR 113, 129-30 (1996); see also Ranamur,
supra note 2, at 19 [hereinafter Wellenius].
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legislature. 20 New regulatory institutions separated from operating entities
were established to accompany privatization. Generally, important
improvements were made in companies before privatization; in other cases,
the companies were sold "as is," leaving internal changes to be made by
new owners.
Following a strategic partnership model of privatization, present with
more or less importance in all countries, several measures were taken to
make the state-enterprise more attractive to investors. Profitability was
increased, for instance, by raising prices for regulated services in the range
of 65% in Mexico to 95 in Argentina before privatization. The increase in
prices for telephone services was necessary not only in order to find buyers
but also to offset the risks of doing business in developing countries and to
motivate investment in networks after privatization. Similarly, in
Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela, taxes on telephone users were sharply
reduced to increase demand. In order to protect investors from the risks of
inflation and price regulation, the use of price-cap regulation after
privatization was widely adopted; such regulations lasted for periods
varying from six years in Mexico, eight in Venezuela, and up to ten in
Argentina. In addition, capital structures were modified before sale to
allow minority owners to have administrative control. This was achieved by
concentrating the voting power in a special class of stock later in the hands
of the winning consortium. As a result, the strategic investors could control
the company by buying minority percentages of equity.21 The privatized
companies also would be granted exclusivity privileges for a limited time in
basic telephone services, one of two licenses for cellular service, and would
not be prohibited from diversifying into services open to competition.
2. THE PRIVATIZATION PROCESS, SALE MECHANISM, OWNERSHIP
AND PRICE
Privatization was realized mainly through international competitive
bidding. The bidding and award processes were designed to enhance
credibility and price competition. International investors were, in general,
20 In Argentina, for instance, privatization was made by Executive Decrees (basically decrees
731/89, outlining the government's new sector policies and structure; decree 62/90, setting forth the terms
and conditions of the competitive bidding and including the terms of licenses to be granted to the new
operators; and decree 1185/90, creating the Comisi6n Nacional de Telecomunicaciones) following broad
laws passed by Congress (the State Reform Law 23,696 enacted in September 1989) to deal with the
country's economic crisis. See Mairal, supra note 5, at 162, 164. In Mexico, the strategy deliberately
avoided any component that required legislature's approval. See Melo, supra note 5, at 145-50. However in
Venezuela, the privatizers had to maneuver through the obstacles set up by legislators. See Pisciotta, supra
note 5, at 188-89.
21 For instance, 20.4% in Mexico and 40% in Venezuela.
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ready to invest in these attractive privatized sectors by relying upon factors
such as market growth prospects, country risks and the level of tariffs and
22other business factors prior to privatization.
Governments chose to sell to consortia led by well-established foreign
operating companies capable of providing expert management, large
investment plans and access to the latest technologies. Ownership
structure was widely distributed among company employees, domestic and
foreign investors and the public at large. Turning over controlling interest
to private owners placed administrative control and management
responsibility on a single owner group, and within it, on the strategic
investor, who or which was responsible for operating the company. This
foreign participation was balanced by including in the consortium local
partners contributing in local management and supplies, as well as in
government, financial, and labor relations. 24
A brief summarization of the bidding process, awards and distribution
of shares was as follows:
Argentina was a model of fast privatization. In Argentina, ENTel
25was divided into two regional companies, Telco Norte and Telco
Sur (each including about half of the lucrative Buenos Aires
market). 26 After overcoming a number of problems related to
domestic opposition, 27  ENTel's structural problems28  and the
22 A reflect of the interest raised among foreign operators and investors may be exemplified by the
following facts: seven consortia of foreign operators and banks associated with domestic investors
prequalified to bid for ENTel in Argentina, the sale of shares in Argentina were several times
oversubscribed, and Chilean CTC's first international issue of stock was also oversubscribed.
23 For instance in Venezuela, in order to prequalify for the international bidding, companies were
required to have more than 6 million installed lines, over 25% digitalization of local exchanges, over 65% in
completion of international calls, one month average waiting time for new lines, and 16 hour average time
for line repair. See Pisciotta, supra note 5, at 187.
24 For instance, in TELMEX, the local partner assumed control of finance, administration, and
purchasing, while France T616com became involved in expanding and modernizing the network, and
Southwestern Bell was responsible for strengthening systems and marketing. See Ramrnamurti, supra note 2,
at 42.
25 Two main reasons were considered for this division: first, the government would stimulate a sort
of "competition by comparison" between natural monopolies obtaining thereafter valuable comparative
information; second, the basis for effective competition would be set for when monopoly status ended and
each Telco, as well as any newcomer, were free to enter into other Telco's region. See Mairal, supra note 5,
at 164.
26 International service and telecommunications services not subject to an exclusive license were
turned over to two separate companies, Telintar and Startel, respectively. Each was jointly owned by the
regional companies.
27 See Petrazzini, supra note 16, at 120-21.
28 See Mairal, supra note 5, at 164-68.
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bidding process, 29 the government sold 60% of each new regional
company to foreign telecommunications companies responsible for
managing the new entities. In November 1990, Telco Norte, re-
named "Telecom Argentine Stet-France T6l6com S.A.," was
awarded to the consortium headed by STET, an Italian operator,
and France T6lcom in partnership with J.P. Morgan and a big
Argentine industrial group. Telco Sur, re-named "Telef6nica de
Argentina S.A.," was awarded to a consortium led by Telef6nica de
Espafia S.A. in partnership with Citibank and two major Argentine
groups. The remaining 40% of shares were sold in December 1991
and February 1992 to employees and, successfully, to the public at
large in the domestic and international markets.
Mexico served as a model of privatization in a large country. In
Mexico, 30 the privatization of TELMEX was completed in three stages.
First, stock was offered for sale to company employees; then, a controlling
interest was offered for sale to Mexican domestic investment groups, with
strict limits on the pai-ticipation of foreign investors as partners; finally,
shares were offered for sale in world capital markets. In December 1990, a
consortium of Mexican investors joined by Southwestern Bell and France
T616com, purchased the controlling interest in the company.
Generally, privatized companies were granted operating concessions
with monopoly privileges for the provision of basic telephone services and
local and long distance (accounting for 90% or more of the sector's
revenues) services for periods ranging from six years in Mexico, to eight in
Venezuela, and up to ten in Argentina. At the same time, competition was
immediately open in important non-basic services such as cellular
telephony 1 and value-added services.32 At the end of the exclusivity
29 Bell Atlantic, which was one of an original three bidding consortiums, did not qualify because
the "pliegos" required that foreign telephone companies contribute at least 10% to the bidding consortium's
equity, and Bell Atlantic was barred under United States rules from investing more than 4.9%. The
government, desperate to accommodate an American company, reduced the threshold from 10 to 4.9%.
Despite this, Bell Atlantic withdrew its bid at the last minute when its financial partner was unable to
acquire the required amount of Argentine debt. See Petramni, supra note 16, at 128-29.
30 See Cassaus, supra note 5, at 182.
31 For instance, in Argentina, in November 1989, the first private cellular network entered in
service in Buenos Aires. The network was built, owned and operated by a consortium, Compaftia de
Radiocomunicaciones M6viles, controlled by Bell South, Motorola, Citicorp Argentina, and the local
Socma and BGH. See AMBROSE Er AL, supra note 4, at 40.
32 In Venezuela, by attempting to encourage competition, not only in value-added services, but
also in private network services (which in some respects are substitutes for basic services) the privatization
process was perceived as being more aggressive than others. See Pisciotta, supra note 5, at 188-89; see also
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periods, competition would be introduced in all segments of the sector. In
addition, as set forth in concession contracts, extension and existence of
monopoly rights were made contingent upon meeting strong investment
plans and high performance targets regarding digitalization and
improvement of quality of services, management and expansion of services
in urban and rural areas. Depending on the different strategies followed by
the countries to carry out privatization, the prices paid and the conditions of
sale varied considerably from one country to another: from $700 per line in
the case of ENTel, to $3200 in the case of CANTV.
C. Evaluating Results and Features from Experiences
Because the strategies33 and the pace of privatization have differed, the
results and the lessons obtained also have been different. A general
framework and one major exemplifying feature from each process can be
drawn.
In general terms, the various results of privatization have been very
positive for the countries involved. Under private ownership, companies
have adopted aggressive strategies to increase the volume, variety, and
quality of telecommunications services. Investments have been
accelerated34, the number of lines has significantly grown,35 new
technology has been incorporated,36 waiting lists have been reduced,3 and
Francds, supra note 15, at 167-69.
33 Among the different possibilities available to privatize national telecommunications companies,
governments have, among others, the following options: negotiated sale of 100% of the company to a single
buyer, sale of a minority stake to a single buyer or group of buyers, public offerings in the domestic market
or international markets or both, sale of a minority stake to a single purchaser combined with a public
offering, and breakup and sale of components. See e.g. Dean Lewis, Options for Selling a
Telecommunications Company, in IMPLEMENTING REFORMS IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECrOR at 425,
425-31(Bjbrr Wellenius and Peter A. Stem eds., 1996); See VuY tEKE, supra note I, at 7-71 for an in-
depth analysis of these and other methods.
3 For instance, in Argentina, since two regional companies started operating, they have made
investments of more than $5.5 billion. In Venezuela, between 1991 and 1995 more than $2 billion was
invested in CANTV, accounting for about 10% of the total gross investment. Telecommunications &
Technology in Latin America 1995, LATIN FIN., Sept. 1995, at 33 [hereinafter LATIN FINI.
35 In Chile, whereas before privatization the number of lines were growing at about 5%, they
expanded at over 20% per annum in 1990 and 1991; in 1995, telephone density was 11.8 lines per 100
inhabitants, exceeding the Latin American average of nine. In Argentina, the number of total lines installed
grew by 65% totaling, in 1995, more than 5.5 million. In Venezuela, basic service expanded to cover 11%
of the population. In Peru, line density raised from 3% to 8.26 lines per 100 inhabitants. Id. at 34-35, 42,
66,72; see also Wellenius, supra note 19, at 115.
36 By 1993, Chile had completed digitization of 99.8% of its telephone network; In Argentina in
1990, only 13% of its network was digital compared to 65% at the end of 1995. See LATIN FIN, supra note
34, at 34-35.
37 In Chile, from eight months to 30 days. In Argentina, from five to 10 years before privatization
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the sector is in constant growth, significantly contributing to the respective
countries' economy.38 Likewise, more efficient use of human and capital
resources have resulted in increasingly efficient enterprises.39 Major
stakeholders also have benefited largely.40
Inasmuch as the privatization of the telecommunications sector
represented the first and longest major privatization program of government
telecommunications assets in developing countries generally, and in Latin
America particularly, several paradigms are established. Chile's
experience, for instance, provides valuable lessons for other countries and
serves as a model of international competitive bidding.' Argentina's
privatization process is a vivid example of the rush to divest the
telecommunications sector under conditions of high economic and political
instability that resulted in a sub-optimal transition.42 Mexico shows not
to averages between three days and three months after privatization. In Peru, from 3 years to 1 year. Id. at
34,65.
38 In Chile, since privatization began, the telecommunications sector has become one of the most
dynamic industries, growing at an average annual rate of more than 19.5% over the last five years. The
dynamic telecommunications sector has strongly contributed to Gross Domestic Product with increases of
more than 100%. CTC alone, has contributed 67%. In Mexico, the sector has grown 15% annually over the
last five years. In Venezuela, telecom-related investments provided 2% of the Gross Domestic Product. Id.
at 41-42,58,71-72.
39 During the period 1982-'90 Chile's CrC workforce was reduced from 15 to nine employees per
1000 lines, and the average cost of installing a new line steadily fell from $130 in 1986 to $110 in 1990.
See Dominique Hachette, et. al., Five Cases of Privatization in Chile, in PRIVATIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA
77, 81-82 (M. Sinchez & R. Corona eds., 1993) [hereinafter Hachette]. In Argentina, the cost of a new line
fell to about $250, the labor force, which was largely de-unionized, shrunk by 25%, and the number of
installed lines per employee raised from 75.7 in 1990 to 154.5 in 1994; see also Mairal, supra note 5, at
172; see also AMBROSE Er AL, supra note 4, at 39-40. Peru's workforce was reduced from 12,051 to 8894,
and ratio lines per worker improved from 55.8 to 86.8. See LATIN FIN., supra note 34, at 34-36, 65-66.
40 For instance, in 1992, TASA, the southern regional company earned $293 million (81% higher
than the precedent year), and was able to finance 80% of its investment program from retained earnings.
See FIN. TIMES, May 18, 1993, at 6.
41 See Hachette, et al., supra note 39, at 74.
42 Although the general outcome can be described as successful, it is more as a consequence of
what was achieved given the situation and reduced schedule, rather than as compared to what could have
been achieved should the privatization process have been properly managed. As the unprecedented
economic and fiscal crisis of 1989 pushed the Argentine government to implement privatization quickly,
ENTei never underwent the kind of restructuring that was carnied out on such firms in Mexico, for instance.
As a result, the failure to prepare ENTel adequately affected its sale price, which was among the lowest paid
for a telecommunications firm in a developing country. The planned liberalization process of the local
telecommunications market was affected by the lack of transparency and predictability of the bidding
process. As the list of. competing bidders diminished, demands of the government increased. The
government was caught in a dilemma: to comply with the announced timetable, the government had to deal
with the only remaining bidders and their costly demands. As a result, the level of initial tariffs had to be
raised above original targets, and the lack of effective regulation immediately after privatization had a
negative impact on sector development and placed the regulatory agency, CNT, at odds with the technical
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only an example of how to privatize the second largest telecommunications
sector in Latin America, but also of how ownership, competition, and
regulation are not only independent policy variables but a set of loosely
connected tools with important interactions.43 Venezuela benefited from
prior experiences and took a planned approach that showed the importance
of the regulatory process, before and after privatization, to foster market
developments. 44 Conversely, Peruvian privatization is to some extent, an
example of how consumers pay the price for and because of poor regulation
and governments desperately needing to raise cash.45
I1. INTERNATIONALIZATION OF MULTINATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS OPERATORS
The telecommunications sector is not only one of the fastest growing
sectors in the world but also one of the most rapidly changing ones. This
holds for the regulatory framework, which is leading to more liberalized
national markets, as well as for the national and international market
structure, characterized by market entry of newcomers, mergers of
monopoly powers at national levels and the creation of new international
and global strategic alliances. The strategic choice of MTOs'
internationalization is thus influenced not only by external opportunities
offered by privatization but also by domestic, external and internal factors.
This section focuses on how deregulation at the European and national
level have led Telef6nica to reinforce and expand its international strategy.
Then, internal and external MTO's factors and strategies determining
internationalization will be explored. Finally, the most important methods
to implement internationalization will be discussed.
A. Deregulation as a Driving Force Behind the Internationalization of
European Telecommunications Operators
The importance of efficient telecommunications networks for the
European Union ("EU") cannot be measured merely in terms of income
generated (more than $140 billion) or in terms of its direct and indirect
employment (more than 1.5 million jobs); efficient telecommunications are
also vital for the purpose of achieving social cohesion throughout the EU.46
and political tasks assigned to it. See Petrazzini, supra note 16, at 137-38; Wellenius, supra note 19, at 117-
18; see also Davidovich, supra note 9, at 169-70.
43 See Rarnamurti 2, supra note 18, at 103.
44 See Pisciotta, supra note 5, at 192-93; see also Frances, supra note 15, at 148, 170-71.
45 See BUSINESS LATIN AMERICA, June 3, 1996, at 3.
46 See European Commission, White Paper, Growth, Competitiveness, Employment: the
Challenges and Ways Forward into the 21st Century, COM (93) 700, 1993; The Bangernan Report,
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Efficient telecommunications networks for the EU would, moreover,
improve the competitiveness of the European industry in world markets.47
The United States and Japan, both main trading rivals of the EU were
perceived as possessing an important competitive advantage after
introducing competition in the sector. The challenge facing the EU was
therefore, achieving a balance between employment restructuring and
social cohesion while simultaneously allowing business and society to
obtain the benefits of technology, the internal market, and competition,
without sacrificing any one of them.48 The solution applied was granting
the application of EU competition law a central role to ensure that
liberalization was speedy and effective. 49 Liberalization and introduction of
competition at European and national levels has been critical in shaping
internationalization strategies of European MTOs.
1. DEVELOPMENTS AT THE EUROPEAN LEVEL
From the first liberalization efforts in the mid-1980s, 50 the progress
toward liberalization within the EU became considerable in the early
1990s. Once a general political framework was established and a political
Europe and the Global Information Society. Report of the High Level Group on the Information Society,
Brussels, May 1994.
47 See European Commission, XXIVth Report on Competition Policy, 1995, at 2.
48 See Europe Documents, Van Miert's Recommendations for the Liberalization of Telephone
Services in the Community, AGENCE EUROPE, April 22, 1993.
49 European Commission, Europe's way to the Information Society. An Action Plan, COM (94)
347, 1994.
50 It was not until 1984 that the first initiatives in telecommunications were launched. Following
the first action program, some factors contributed to the rapid development of the European
telecommunications policy. First, the growing digitization began to transform the telecommunication
networks into multi-purpose information infrastructures extending service opportunities far beyond the
traditional telephone services. As a result, a growing conviction arose among Member States that if
traditional monopoly rights were not reduced it could not be assured either that new markets could be
developed, or that the new technologies and service offerings could be incorporated rapidly enough. In
addition, the impact of two important processes leading to the introduction of liberalization and competition
in the sector began to be felt in Europe making Member States become more receptive to the concept of
market deregulation: one was the 1982 AT&T divestiture agreement; the other was the progressive
deregulation and privatization of British Telecommunications in the United Kingdom. Finally the European
Court of Justice also had a pivotal role as it confirmed, in its 1985 BT judgment that European competition
rules were fully applicable to the telecommunications sector. See Gonzalo Garcia Jimnez, Towards Full
Liberalization of the Telecommunications Sector in the European Union Trough the Application of
Competition Laws, on file, Centre de documentation europfenne, Institute of European Legal Studies,
Faculty of Law, University of Liege, June 1996, at 9-11 [hereinafter Garcfa 1]; see also Gonzalo Garca
Jimdnez, Overview of International Telecommunications Regulations: The European Union, in BEYOND
THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT: A DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL REFERENCE FOR BUSINESS, 215-40,
(T. Knuer, et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter Garcia 2];
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consensus among member states ("Member States") of the EU developed
that full liberalization was a priority,51 a strong liberalization impetus came
52from the European Commission ("EC") imposing Article 90 directives on
Member States to open up the telecommunications markets to competition.
The aim of EC legislation creating a framework for effective competition is
realized through a complementary role between liberalization and
harmonization. This process of liberalization and introduction of
51 The development of the telecommunications policy framework was, from the start, based on
comprehensive EC consultative documents called the "Green Papers." The Green Papers established basic
policy goals for public debate, thereby setting out the proposed overall concept and leading to broad
consultations and subsequent adoption by resolutions of the EU Council of Ministers and the European
Parliament. These resolutions set a framework with regard to general competitive conditions required in
order to achieve liberalization in the sector. This method of proposing comprehensive policy preliminary
plans, broad consultations and transparency was the emblem in the development of the policy framework.
The 1987 telecommunications Green Paper (concluding that reserved services should be narrowly defined
and new services open to competition) and the 1992 Review of the Situation in the Telecommunications
Service Sector (concluding that monopoly rights were hindering the development of the sector and
ultimately leading to a consensus on the inevitability and desirability of full liberalization) were essential
pieces in the process. See Gonzalo Garcia Jimnez, Towards Full Liberalization of the Telecommunications
Sector in the European Union Trough the Application of Competition Laws, on file, Centre de
documentation europienne, Institute of European Legal Studies, Faculty of Law, University of Liege, June
1996, at 11-14. For a brief but clear-cut analysis see Reinaldo Rodriguez Mera, La liberalizacidn de las
telecomunicaciones en la Unitn Europea, in DERECHO DE LAS TELECOMUNICACIONES, 279-85 (Javier
Cremades ed., 1997) [hereinafter Mera]; see also H. Ungerer, EU Competition Law in the
Telecommunications, Media and Information Technology Sectors, Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 22nd
Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law & Policy, Fordham University, New York, October
1995.
52 From the issuing of the 1987 Green Paper, Article 90 has developed into a cornerstone of the
Commission's telecommunications policy. Article 90 (3) provides the Commission with the power to adopt
directives and decisions binding on Member States in order to ensure compliance of state monopolies with
Article 90 (1) and 90 (2). The basic principle of Article 90 (1) is that Member States must respect the
underlying rule that the undertakings granted monopoly rights must, in principle, comply with the Treaty's
roles, and must not, therefore, act to undermine this. In other case, Article 90 requires the removal of special
and exclusive rights. Article 90 (2) limits the application of the Treaty rules, and the competition roles in
particular, where they threaten to obstruct the performance of public service duties by undertakings
entrusted with such duties (in the case, security of supply and universal service provided by national TOs).
For an analysis of ECJ's interpretation of these principles see Garcia 1, supra note 50, at 4-9, 19-21, 27-31;
see also S. Taylor, Article 90 and Telecommunications Monopolies, 15 EUROPEAN COMPETITION L REV.
6, 322-34 (1994); see also Jaime Folguera Crespo and Edume Navarro Varona, Aplicaci6n de los articulos
30, 59, 85, 86 y 90 del Tratado CE a los mercados de telecomunicaciones, in DERECHO DE LAS
TELECOMUNICACIONES 210, 210-43 (Javier Cremades ed., 1997).
53 This is so because abolishing monopolies did not mean that competition would emerge straight
away, as TOs that have enjoyed this monopoly for a long time would continue to hold sizable chunks of the
market and key rights. Therefore, introducing competition through Article 90 directives was not enough.
Harmonization directives under Article IOOA were also essential in order to establish a genuine common
market in telecommunications, in which competition roles are properly applied. Harmonization Council
directives were also necessary to ensure that newly liberalized markets were not fragmented along national
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competition has also heavily relied upon the European Court of Justice's
judgments.54
However, whereas several market telecommunications segments were
soon exposed to competition, 5  the core fields of national TOs, namely
voice telephony services and public switched telecommunications
56networks, were still dominated by highly protected national monopolies.
As revenues from these key segments amounted up to 85% of total
revenues, effective competition in the telecommunications sector could not
effectively be achieved until they were liberalized. The 1993 Council
Telecommunications Development Resolution57 agreed to proposals by the
Commission to fully liberalize telephony services within the EU by January
1, 1998.58
lines by, for instance, diverse licensing and type approval procedures or interface specifications. The Open
Network Provisions directives aimed, therefore, to guarantee that access by all service providers and users is
harmonized, objective, transparent and non-discriminatory across the EU. See Garcia 1, supra note 50, at
18-19,26.
54 On the one hand, by upgrading the introductory paragraph of Article 3g of the Treaty of the EU
(which fists the introduction of a system of undistorted competition among the activities of the EU) to
become a fundamental principle of Community law, has turned Community law into a basically monopoly-
unfriendly legal system. On the other hand, by interpreting in a narrow manner the derogation given under
Article 90 (2) and by interpreting the provisions of Article 90 (3) as confirming the Commission's
competence to break down state monopolies, the ECJ gave the Commission the confidence to "tackle"
telecommunications monopolies in the EU and accelerate the liberalization process with the required
impetus. Id. at 50-51.
55 F'rst, competition was introduced in terminal equipment, including inter alia telephone sets,
modems and terminal telex. See EC Commission Directive 88/301/EEC, Official Journal of the European
Communities (OJ.) L1311/3, May 16, 1988. Then, the services directive opened to competition
telecommunication services (data transmission and value-added). In addition by defining very narrowly the
term voice telephony (reserved service excluded from competition) the directive also liberalized telephony
services other than those provided for the general public such as private corporate networks and closed user
groups. See EC Commission Directive 90/388/EEC, O.J. L192110, July 24, 1990. Finally, satellite
communications equipment and services, cable TV networks telecommunications services and mobile and
personal communications were liberalized and fair competition was ensured. See respectively, EC
Commission Directives 94/46/EC, O.J. 1268/15, Oct. 19, 1994; 95/51/EC, O.J. 1256/49, Oct. 18, 1995;
96/2/EC, 120/59, Jan. 16, 1996. See Garcia 1, supra note 50, at 22-35.
56 In fact, the 1987 Green Paper provided for the temporary reservation of non-competition in
basic voice in order to allow the TOs to receive protected revenues to maintain their universal service
obligation, a principle that the Commission did not want to sacrifice. The TOs could therefore use this
breathing space to adjust and modernize in order to meet the challenges of the emerging market place.
Garcfa I, supra note 50, at 12.
57 Council Resolution of July 22, 1993, on the review of the situation in the telecommunications
sector and the need for further development in that market. O.J. C213/1 (1993).
58 EC Commission Directive 96/19/EC, O.J. L75/13, Mar. 22, 1996.
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2. DEVELOPMENTS AT NATIONAL LEVEL
Though EC directives are binding for Member States, they leave a
certain degree of freedom to national legislatures to make national law
commensurate with EC legislation. It is therefore clear that progress in
liberalizing telecommunications markets59 depends ultimately on how
Member States implement and enforce EC directives. Delays in adapting
national legislation in order to comply with the directives can create
practical difficulties for business ventures. In order to cope with this
situations EC law provides procedures for eliminating such obstacles.60 The
majority of Member States must liberalize basic vocal telephony from
59 The legal telecommunications framework in Spain is established basically by the Ley de
Ordenaci6n de las Telecomunicaciones ("LOT") 31/1987 of December 18. This law meant progress in the
regulation in the sector because, before this law, the sector lacked specific laws except for the concession
contract between the State and Telef6nica and a series of provisions inferior in rank to law. Liberalization of
terminals was developed in 1989 by Royal Decree 1066/1989, and award of a second mobile telephony
service was fulfilled by Order of December 24, 1994. Since publication, LOT has been partially reformed
three times: the first one by Law 32/1992 of December 3, to conform to Community developments after the
issuing of the 1987 Green Paper (mainly the Services Directive and the Council Open Network Provision
Directive, a framework directive providing for harmonization; the second by Law 42/1995 of December 22,
and Law 37/1995 of December 12, respectively, the Cable Telecommunications Law and Satellite
Telecommunications Law; the third one by Royal Decree 6/1996 of June 7 of Liberalization of
Telecommunications. This last reform is of capital importance since, first, it provides for the creation of the
Comisi6n del Mercado de las Telecomrunicaciones, an independent body attached to the Ministerio de
Fomento, the Ministry responsible for Public Works, Transportation and Telecommunications- which is
mainly assigned to safeguard the competition rules in the sector, to arbitrate when conflicts arise between
operators and to advise the Ministry in the development of roles), and second, it creates a second global
telecommunications operator in Spain, Retevision (which is in process of privatization), putting an end to
Telefonica's monopoly in basic services and networks, thereby providing for the transition from monopoly
to duopoly in preparation for a close-at-hand full competition environment. Currently under way is the
discussion of the draft bill that will replace the LOT and regulate the Spanish telecommunications sector
once fully liberalized. During the liberalization process the Tribunal de Defensa de la Competencia has also
played an important role by securing a fair level playing field. See Javier Cremades Garcfa, El Derecho de
las telecomunicaciones en Europa y en Esparla, in DERECHO DE LAS TELECOMUNICACIONES, 7-93 (Javier
Cremades ed., 1997); Rodrigo Urfa Meru6ndano, El Derecho y las telecomunicaciones, in DERECHO DE
LAS TLECOMUNICACIONES, 108-10 (Javier Cremades ed., 1997); Marcos Amujo Boyd, El Derecho de la
competencia y las telecomunicaciones, in DERECHO DE LAS TELECOMUNICACIONES, 784-85 (Javier
Cremades ed., 1997).
60 Under Treaty Article 90 procedure, when a Member State has not amended the offending
regulation, or justified or compensated for them after receiving a letter of formal notice of the Commission,
the latter may adopt a formal Article 90 (3) decision requiring the government to end the infringement
within a set time period. If it does not comply, proceedings under the Treaty Article 169, which confers the
Commission with the power to ensure that EC law is enforced over the national law of Member States, may
be launched which result in a judgment from the ECJ. Failure to implement a subsequent Court judgment
will ultimately result in fines. In addition, as recognized by the ECJ, national governments are even liable to
compensate companies in case of infringement of Treaty provisions conferring rights on the latter. See
Garcia, supra note 50, at 43-44.
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January 1, 1998; Spain, however, as a peripheral region within the EU, has
an additional transition period of five years to do so. Despite Spain's right
to postpone full liberalization until the year 2003 at the latest61 it will,
eventually, be effective from 1999.62
Although European TOs are currently concluding preparations for the
single European telecommunications market, their strategies for becoming
competitive in the international arena are quite different. This is a result of
different national regulatory frameworks and national telecommunications
63structures. Such differences play a decisive role in establishing MTOs'
defensive or offensive strategy of internationalization. Losing a monopoly
in a portion of telecommunication services forces operators to recover
abroad the market share they lose6 or anticipate losing. By the same token,
national TOs paying little attention to the outside world are in danger of
losing their ability to compete and hence of losing national and
international markets. Telef6nica65 has been a pristine representative66 of
61 European Report, Spain to liberalize telecommunications by 2003 at the latest, European
Report, n. 2149, July 17 (1996), Section il at 1.
62 Although full liberalization is scheduled for January 1998, it will not be effective until 1999.
This compromise reached with the Commission allows the second global Spanish operator a fundamental
two-year period of breathing space before other European TO competitors enter the Spanish market. During
this time, as European standards make no provision for the principle of reciprocity, Telef6nica and
Retevision are allowed to access deregulated European basic telephony markets from January 1998 forward
without permitting TOs in these Member States to get a foothold on the Spanish market until late 1999. At
the same time the compromise also allowed the Commission to present a more homogeneous, liberalized
and competitive packet to be better positioned to negotiate market access during the negotiations leading to
the new WTO Telecommunications Agreement reached in February 15, 1997. See mera, supra note 51, at
88-89.
63 Cornelius (raack, Telecoms Operators in the European Union. Internationalization Strategies
and Network Alliances, 20 TELECOMMUNICATIONS POL'Y 5, 343 (1996) [hereinafter Graack].
64 Finnish Telecom, British Telecom and Swedish Telia are representatives of this defensive
approach, by which they expand their activities into foreign markets aiming to compensate losses in
liberalized home markets. Id. at 349-51.
65 Almudena Arp6n de Mendivil y Aldama, Telcommunications Regulation in Spain, 2
COMPUTER AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS L REV., 112 (1996) [hereinafter A. De Mendivil] ("The
fundamental point of the LOT... [was] the consideration of telecommunications as essential state-owned
services reserved for the public sector"). Telef6nica has traditionally been a private company in which the
state held an important share. However, after the liberalization efforts imposed by the Commission,
privatization was progressively achieved. Nowadays, after resolution of the Council of Minister of
December 20, 1996, Telef6nica has been fully privatized in the first semester of 1997 by selling the
remaining t of state control. See Josd Luis AlbAcar Rodriguez, El plan nacional de telecomunicaciones.
El contrato del Estado con Teleftnica S.A., in DERECHO DE LAS TELECOMUNICACIONEs 643, 643-60 (Javier
Cremades ed., 1997).
6 Other monopolies following the same strategy are France T6ltcom, Deutsche Telekom, Telecom
Italia, and Dutch Telecom. See Graack, supra note 63, at 343-46.
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monopolies pursuing international expansion while national markets were
still protected from competition.
Protection has not meant stagnation in the Spanish telecommunications
market. Conversely, the liberalization of the sector, by allowing for
progressive competition, either total or restricted, with regard to the
number of operators in accordance with the different affected services has
brought the incorporation of technological developments in networks and
services. Such innovations in networks and services have, in turn, allowed
companies to improve competitiveness and to be better prepared for
internationalization of the sector. Ultimately, the competitiveness of
Spanish companies in general is improved. 67
As a result, since the beginning of the 1990s, Telef6nica has been
reinforcing its international expansion strategy. Such expansion is due, in
part, to the opening up of new, mainly Latin American, markets and
profitable growth opportunities. By late 1996 Telef6nica had a stake in
telecommunications operators in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico,
Peru, Puerto Rico, Portugal, Romania, and Venezuela.
B. Factors and Strategies Determining MTOs' Internationalization
The new framework of privatization and liberalization in the
telecommunications sector encouraged operators to devise opportunistic
internationalization strategies, both of defensive and offensive nature. In
addition, the increased degree of internationalization and integration of
worldwide economies had produced a demand for global
telecommunications services that hardly can be satisfied by operators on
their own. Therefore, a policy of international and global alliances plays a
leading role in the strategic plans of major operators.
1. FACTORS DETERMINING THE STRATEGY
69A MTO can begin an internationalization process if it enjoys certain
specific advantages not possessed by the recipient country.
Internationalization must make it possible to maintain, and if possible
improve, a company's competitive advantage. In this regard, an
internationalization process is possible if there are corporate capabilities
and ownership-specific advantages to carry it through, as well as the will to
exploit them on a transnational scale. Proprietary comparative advantages
67 See A. De Mendfvil, supra note 65, at 113.
68 TELEF6NICA, 1995 ANNUAL REPORT 34-39 (1995); Telef6nica Intemacional: Presentaci6n a
AT&T, New York, November 1996 at 11 [hereinafter Telef6nica Intemacional].
69 See generally, John H. Dunning, Dunning's Eclectic Paradigm in MULTINATIONAL
ENIERPRISES AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, 75, 75-85 (1993).
1998]
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are embodied in intangible assets such as know-how, expertise, and
management capability, and are evidenced by leadership in service costs
and differentiation 70 as well as by the capability to enter new markets and
to cooperate with others. On the other hand, as will be analyzed later on,
the economies of location 71 (market size, structure and degree of
integration, country risks, factor productivity, investment climate) will
determine the geographical setting of the chosen internationalization
process. In addition to all of these factors, companies were ready to gain
the maximum profit from internationalization in order to achieve a balance
between Latin American countries' need to create a desired infrastructure
and MTO' s own process of expansion.
In broad terms, company internationalization can be defined as the
course of action of pursuing new markets outside the country. A
fundamental issue is that internationalization strategy must be addressed
from within a company's general strategy, accounting for the growing
72integration and globalization of the economy. In this context, MTO
internationalization can respond both to offensive strategies to take
advantage of opportunities that did not previously exist, and to defensive
strategies to stand up to new competition. Although both strategies have
played an important role in Telef6nica's internationalization, offensive
strategies have proved to be determinant.
2. DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE STRATEGIES
As previously examined, in pursuing a strategy of international
expansion Telef6nica has reacted, to some extent, to its domestic regulatory
environment brought about by the acceleration of European integration in
the telecommunications sector. The prospects for introducing competition
in its domestic market made Telef6nica react to ensure its survival and
growth in the face of aggressive strategies from other competitors. The
purpose was to gain elsewhere the space which was to be worn away in the
domestic market.73
70 For instance, high level of quality and service penetration, market management, forecasting and
restructuring skills.
71 John H. Dunning, International Direct Investment Patterns, in THE GLOBAL RACE FOR
FOREIGN DIRECr INVESTMENT 127-30 (Lars Oxelheim ed., 1993) [hereinafter Dunning].
72 Juan Josd Durn Herrera and Fernando Gallardo Olmedo, La estrategia de internacionalizaci6n
de las operadoras de teleconumicaciones, 735 INFoRMACION COMERCImAL ESPANOLA 3, 93 (1994)
[hereinafter Durdn and Gallardo].
73 Franco Masari, Internationalizing Telecommunications Operations: STET and the Argentina
Experience, in IMLEMENTING REFORMS IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR, 406 (Bj6m Wellenius and
Peter A. Stem eds., 1996).
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However, Telef6nica's strategy of entering foreign markets while home
markets were still protected by regulation can be best characterized as
offensive in nature, whereby the wish to expand came before the need to
survive. In this sense, apart from the inherent nature and dynamics of the
telecommunications sector, changes in the environment such as
liberalization and privatization coupled with significant improvements in
the foreign investment climates, provide sufficient motives for considering
the viability of internationalizing a competitive advantage. Therefore,
Telef6nica has, in addition to seeking out new markets, strengthened its
competitive advantage on an international scale and advanced in a global
competitive position.
Cultural affinities, language, and EU-Latin American political and
institutional relations have also facilitated Telef6nica's adaptation and
responses to the environment of Latin American countries. As a result, in
comparison with other companies which come from environments
culturally and socially more distant, Telef6nica has not only reduced
transaction costs but also diminish the impact of country risk.74
C. Methods to Implement Internationalization: MTOs Acting Alone or
as Part of International and Global Alliances
Once the advisability of internationalizing was established, Telef6nica
faced the dilemma of doing so alone or in alliance with other MTOs. The
internationalization method depended on the potential associated
transaction costs75 such as the degree of asset specificity (related to
resources and technological and managerial capabilities) and uncertainty
(e.g., risks associated with the supply of services) surrounding the
76transaction. While there are a number of economic reasons favoring
74 Juan Josd Durhi, General Trends of Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America: Special
Reference to Spain, in OECD Proceedings, INVESTMENT POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND MULTILATERAL
RULES ON INVESTMET 35 (1997) [hereinafter Dunn].
75 John H. Dunning, The Global Economy, Domestic Governance strategies and Transnational
Corporations: Interactions and Policy Implications, I TRANSNAT'L CORPORATIONS 6, 13-17 (1992).
76 When trying to determine the optimal size of a finn's strategic alliances five main reasons have
to be taken into account: first, the alliance may help to penetrate markets that the operator cannot possibly
approach on its own (in this case economic valuation is based on income generated in the new market
thanks to the alliance); second, the alliance helps to learn an activity in which the operator does not
overwhelmingly enjoy proprietary competitive advantages; third, the possible generation of know-how as a
result of collaboration between the alliance's agents, which materializes in net income in the future; fourth,
if an operator succeeds in forming a stable alliance with another operator that could compete with it in its
natural market, it could thus avoid this danger and keep income not lost to the competition; and fifth, given
that the telecommunications sector is characterized by fast, frequent technological changes, be ready to give
prompt answer to new services and variants of others already in existence. See generally P. Llerena and S.
Wolff, Inter-Firm Agreements in Telecommunications: Elements of an Analytical Framework in GLOBAL
1998]
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internationalizing through alliances, the essential reason operators decide to
do so is, generally, to attenuate risk"7 and to spread the financial
requirements 78 of the investment. Telef6nica acted alone, for instance, in
only two cases, Chile and Puerto Rico. With respect to Chile, Telef6nica
was attracted to a low country risk and a strong market-oriented economy
which favored private enterprise and foreign investment. In Puerto Rico, a
private deal between the government and Telef6nica resulted because of an
unrealistic minimum bid-price that scared away potential bidders. Outside
of these two isolated investments, Telef6nica has acted as a member of a
consortium, the most important instrument to carry out an alliance in the
telecommunications sector.
As will be analyzed below, a consortium may be characterized as a
strategic tool for MTOs because it generates organizational capabilities that
are enshrined in specific knowledge of inter-organizational relations and
environment. Specific knowledge acquired through strategic cooperation
through a consortium cuts off adaptation costs to new environments and
costs of transferring organizational abilities from one context (home
domestic country, or host regional market) to other (host regional market,
or international or global markets). In addition, the participation of MTOs
in several consortia provides intangible assets for the MTOs concerned as
they acquire experience in managing this kind of business organization that
can be exploited in future collaborative operations. Ultimately, the MTO
generates or improves a new competitive advantage against its competitors.
From a broader perspective, the relevant market for telecommuni-
cations operators has changed over time from a purely national to a cross-
border market where international cooperation is necessary. As a result,
cooperation between operators is intensifying in the form of global
alliances in order to serve new service requirements of multinational enter-
prises such as one-stop-shopping and to provide global services. One
example of this development is Unisource, a pan-European telecommun-
ications company originally formed by Dutch Telecom, Swiss Telecom,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS STRATEGiEs AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES 257-73 (G. Pogorel ed., 1994).
77 J. Dur n and F. Gallardo, Foreign Direct Investment of Telecommunications Operators in Less
Developed Countries: Application to the Telefrnica Experience, in THE RACE TO EUROPEAN EMINENCE:
WHO ARE THE COMING TELE-SERVICE MULTINATIONALS? 444 (Erik Bohlin & Ove Granstrand eds., 1994)
[hereinafter Durn and Gallardo].
78 Mabelle G. Sonnenschein and Patricia A. Yokopenic, Multinational Enterprises and
Telecomnunications Privatization, in PRIVATIZING MONOPOLIES: LESSONS FROM THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORT SECTORS IN LATIN AMERICA 359 (Ravi Ramamurti ed., 1996)
[hereinafter Sonnenschein and Yokopenic].
?9 One-stop-shopping allows enterprises and other customers to contact only the
telecommunications operator to order and manage all leased international links.
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Swedish Telia, which was joined in 1995 by Telef6nica. 80 Of paramount
importance has been the creation of a so-called Uniworld joint venture be-
tween Unisorce and AT&T, the largest United States telecommunications
81company.
In today's globalized telecommunications industry, globalization of
MTOs is not only a strategy for moving forward but a necessity to
surviving. The creation of dynamic competitive forces capable of bringing
the benefits of competition to all customers and all markets on a global
basis has triggered a dynamic globalization process with and among the
largest American MTOs with Latin America as one of the most important
82battlefields. Given the wide range of international and global alliances
83among major MTOs, this dynamic multiplication of takeovers offers,
alliances and mergers have implications for all major MTOs:84 if they are
not in they are out.
80 Unisorce's main goals are the deployment of a pan-European network and the coordination of
national's TOs to provide global services. See Telef6nica, supra note 68, at 25-26. By the same token it also
provides for easier cooperation between the global alliance and large telecommunications operators such as
AT&T. Cooperation between Unisorce and AT&T seems to be much more stable that cooperation between
AT&T and each single member of Unisoree. See Graack, supra note 63, at 341, 354.
81 See Telef6nica, supra note 68, at 27.
82 In April 1997 TISA formed an alliance with Concert; the network system operated by MCI and
BT. Under the terms of the deal, MCI would gain a 10% share in TISA and Telef6nica would own 33% of
Avantel, the Mexican long-distance operator controlled by MCI. In July 1997, another major alliance took
place among AT&T, STET and Unisorce NV, with a primary goal of increasing Latin American service.
See Sally Bowen and Adam Thomson, Telecom Boom, LATIN TRADE, Oct. 1997, at 48, 52.
83 On October 1, WoddCom, the fourth largest US long-distance operator that has expanded
rapidly into local services, announced a $30 billion takeover offer of MCI (the second largest long-distance
operator). Soon after, on October 16, GTE (the largest US-based local telephone company), after
contemplating a combination with Sprint AT&T, announced $28 billion all-cash bid for MCI. See
generally, FIN. TIMES, October 2, 1997, at 5; William Lewis, Worldcom, FIN. TIMES, October 16, 1997, at
1, 16, 19 [hereinafter Lewis].
84 After announcing a $28 billion for MCI, British Telecom (B) acquired 20% stake in MCI and
formed the global strategic alliance Concert. WorldCom's bid would leave BT with about 10% of the newly
merged company and thus throw into disarray BT's international strategy. By the same token, as Telef6nica
had recently entered in alliance with BT and MCI and, in addition, was negotiating the participation with
MCI in Avantel, WorldCom's bid put into question these developments and produced, at first a sharp fall
of Telefonica's share prices that was only curbed after BT and MCI's issuing soothing statements.
Conversely, it seems, however, that GTE's bid for MCI offers a potential alliance with BT and Telef6nica.
The combination of all four would strengthen their position in the US, Europe, Latin America and Asia (the
latter mainly because if NTI, the largest Japanese operator, showed reluctance to enter in concert; having
two potential US groups would eventually attract it, and also because of Telefonica's participation, since
1991, in the consortium Joint Network Initiatives, formed by AT&T, BT, France T616com and the Japanese
KDD). See generally, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1997, at 5; See Lewis, supra note 83, at 19; see also EL PAS, Oct.
8, 1997, at 9.
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IV. MTOS AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT ASSESSMENT OF
PRIVATIZED LATIN AMERICAN TOS
Once the suitability of the internationalization process is established,
the MTO will initiate the formation of a consortium. Importantly, however,
a MTO will do so only after identifying positive signals regarding their
chances of entering new markets. A MTO will assess several elements in
contemplation of a direct investment 5 : the existence of a potentially
relevant market and a suitable investment climate to conduct business in a
given country, the potential risks involved, the presence of a privatization
and/or liberalization process, and the degree of sector and enterprise
restructuring and regulatory framework.
A. Country and Market Considerations
The long periods required to recover the costs of large investments
associated with telecommunication privatizations make it indispensable for
MTOs to analyze country and market potentialities and conditions and
risks.
1. COUNTRY CONSIDERATIONS
Evaluating a country's stability is critical if a strategic investor is to
accurately appreciate the investment opportunities privatization entails. The
investment opportunities of a country are important to the same extent that
the historical, economic, and political developments of a country add to or
86detract from a privatization opportunity. Attributes of great interest to a
foreign strategic investor include the stability of a country's political
institutions, the state of the national economy, the stability and
convertibility of its currency, its legal system and tax structure, and its
87demographic, social, historical, and cultural conditions. Instability
85 Direct investment is the category of international investment that reflects the objective of
obtaining a lasting interest by a resident entity in one economy in an enterprise in another country... The
lasting interest implies the existence of a long-term relationship between the direct investor and the
enterprise and a significant degree of influence by the investor on the management of the enterprise. [In
addition,] direct investment comprises not only the initial transactions establishing the relationship between
investor and the enterprise but also all subsequent transactions between them and among affiliated
enterprises, both incorporated and unincorporated. FOREIGN DIRECr INVESTMENT IN LATIN AMERICA IN
THE 1990s, 74 (Institute for European-Latin American Relations ed., 1996) quoting INT'L MONETARY
FUND, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS MANUAL 5 (1986).
86 Judith D. O'Neill, Privatization of Telecommunications Enterprises: The Viewpoints of Foreign
Operators, in IMPLEMENTING REFORMS IN THE TEIECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR, 385 (Bjbm Wellenius and
Peter A. Stem eds., 1996) [hereinafter O'Neill].
87 See Sonneschein and Yokopenic, supra note 78, at 345-46; see also O'neill, supra note 86, at
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decreases the attractiveness of an investment and may deter large investors
from entering unstable countries inasmuch as it can mean higher risks for
investment returns and limits on an investor's ability to raise capital.
88
The strategic investor must review country-risk rankings offered by
private consultants and research organizations when evaluating a particular
telecommunications investment and when formulating an appropriate
strategy.8 9 These rankings show the political, economic, and financial risks
of doing business in a targeted country. Factors analyzed to determine the
general country risk are as various as the present and prospective political
situation; economic factor include such as gross domestic product ("GDP")
growth, inflation, exchange fluctuation, the degree of competition in the
market, the pace of change to a market economy, the management of
relations with the government, and labor and socially-related risks.
9
0
Paramount attention must also be paid to how well local capital mar-
kets function, 9' how firm the general legal and constitutional framework is,
92and what precisely the country's foreign investment laws are. The viabil-
ity of long-range investment may rely heavily upon how authorities ensure
transparency of market transactions, appropriate levels of taxation on
capital gains and dividend incomes, how the general legal framework
protects property rights, how the constitution guarantees foreign investors
against nationalization, and how foreign investment laws allow re3patriation
of dividends and foreign legal control of the privatized company.
To the extent that country risk varies throughout the operator's
lifetime, it must be carefully assessed and covered. In order to attenuate
88 For instance, in Argentina the division of ENTEL in two regional companies helped to some
extent to cover the country risk, since if the government decided to expropriate or block funds, it would
antagonized two different investment groups including local partners, and would jeopardize the country's
telecommunications development.
89 See Sonneschein and Yokopenic, supra note 78, at 351.
90 For an updated evaluation of Latin America's economic, political and social risk rating and
other indicators see Political Risk in Latin America: How Safe is Investment?, LATIN AM. SPECIAL
REPORTS, Oct. 1996.
91 For instance, in Argentina one aspect that limits country risk is the weight of TASA's shares on
the Buenos Aires stock exchange. An expropriation of fund blocking operation against the MTO would be
detrimental to the country's stock market.
92 Franqois J. Grossas, Privatization of Telecommunications Enterprises: The Viewpoints of
Investors, in IMPIEMENTiNG EEFORMS IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR, 416-17 (Bj6m Wellenius
and Peter A. Stem eds., 1996) [hereinafter Grssas].
93 For an updated framework of foreign investment regulations and brief analysis of basic rules,
restricted sectors, prevailing attitude, remittance limits and other restrictions, incentives for new
investments, and approval process see for instance, Bus. LATIN AM., The Economist Intelligence Unit,
March 10, 1997, at 4-5. See generally, Roberto Mayorga Lorea, Foreign Investment Regimes in the
Americas: Legal Challenges, in OECD Proceedings, 45-59; Isabella Soares Micali, Legal Environment for
Investment in Latin America: Corporate Law and Bankruptcy, in OECD Proceedings, 69-81
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country risk, several techniques are available to MTOs. Insurance policies
covering country risk can be provided by either private or public companies
such as the Spanish firm Compafiia Espafiola de Seguro y Cr6dito a la
Exportaci6n ("CESCE")94 or by supranational organizations such as the
World Bank's Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency ("MIGA")
95
aiming at improving investor confidence and promoting the flow of
investments to developing member countries. In addition, the very
configuration of a consortium contributes to cover this risk by diversifying
the risk among the partners and, also, by including local partners.96
2. MARKET CONSIDERATIONS
Among the first factors, or entry signals, to be evaluated are
privatization of basic telephone services, liberalization of mobile
communications, and existence of advanced corporate communications
markets. Similarly, local demographic and economic trends also have to be
evaluated in order to determine if they ensure sufficient demand 97 so as to
allow improved quality of services and growth of business.
98
Broader market considerations also are critical for strategic investors.
Provided they have long-term interests in the sector, strategic investors may
be prepared to pay a higher price and to accept lower initial returns on their
investments in exchange for building up a regional or global market
presence. In the case of most Latin American countries, it was also clear
that prospects of strong, open integration would lead to important economic
growth in the region. The liberalization of cross-border markets, implying
an important rise of intra-regional trade, would likely lead to a substantial
rise in cross-border activities of firms and, hence, in the demand of
improved and expanded telecommunications services. 99 The strategic value
of the privatized companies was, therefore, enhanced. The expected growth
of the telecommunications business would allow, in the long run, the
strategic investor not only to gain profits but also to achieve economies of
scale, lower prices, quality of services, digitization, and strong penetration
rates. All of these realizations would allow the privatized company to be
94 See Duran, supra note 74, at 452.
95 MIGA, 1996 ANNUAL REPORT 8-13 (1996). MIGA issues guarantees against non-commercial
risks for investments in its developing member countries that originate in any of its member countries. In
general it covers currency transfer restriction, expropriation, war and civil disturbance, and breach of
contract.
96 See DurAn, supra note 74, at 453.
97 1l at 444. In this regard, a study of demand based on the ratio lines in service per 100
inhabitants can provides clues about what countries are suitable investments.
98 See Sonnenschein and Yokopenic, supra note 78, at 346.
99 See Dunning, supra note 71, at 125.
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well positioned for a future time when the exclusivity period expired and
basic telecommunication services would be open to competition. In
addition, by primarily focusing in the Latin American market, entities such
as Telef6nica were building on regional and global networks l°° and
strengthening their position as a global MTOs.
B. Legal and Regulatory Framework
The investor's evaluation of the privatization process depends heavily
upon: (i) how a particular government plans to restructure its
telecommunications sector; (ii) what legislative and regulatory efforts are
implemented to accomplish such objectives; and (iii) what regulatory
framework under which the company will operate will ultimately exist.'01
1. SECTOR CONSIDERATIONS
A successful privatization can occur only if necessary restructuring of
the telecommunications sector and separation between regulatory and
operating functions have been achieved before privatization. For this
purpose, and in order to assure purchasers of the government's
commitments, it is necessary to draft and enact legislation to change
telecommunications and foreign investments laws, to create an independent
regulatory body, 0 2 to create a proper budgetary infrastructure to ensure that
a private company will be paid for services rendered, 1 3 and to create some
mechanism to solve conflicts when competition is introduced.
10 4
Usually, representatives of interested MTOs will meet at an early stage
with a particular government to discuss and negotiate regulatory rules. If a
regulatory scheme focuses on the carrier rather than on the service, the
government is better able to encourage growth of the sector, whilst
achieving universality, quality of service and reasonable price; at the same
time, the investor is better able to picture the future and make more
accurate financial projections.1 5
100 Maurice Odle, Foreign Direct Investments as Part of the Privatization Process, 2
TRANSNAT1ONAL CORPORATIONS 23, at 23-34 (1993) [hereinafter Odle].
101 See O'Neill, supra note 86, at 385.
102 For instance in Chile was created the Subsecretarfa de Telecommunicaciones with tasks relating
mainly to technical regulations and licenses to new suppliers, in Argentina these tasks were carried out by
the Comisi6n Nacional de Telecomunicaciones.
103 This is necessary because in a natural monopoly environment, budgetary cross-subsidies usually
prevail. As the State needs to ensure universal service, the profits from one service (i.e., long distance) cover
losses in other (i.e., local, rural), in cases of general deficit it is covered by national budget.
104 For instance in Peru, arbitration allows the company to resolve conflicts without going to the
local courts. See Sonnenschein and Yokopenic, supra note 78, at 347,
105 See O'Neill, supra note 86, at 389.
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Also of paramount importance, investors must be acutely aware of
future operating conditions. A government needs to balance two competing
objectives. On the one hand, a government may grant a strategic investor
exclusivity for a limited number of years as a means of reducing investment
risk and ensuring a stable flow of revenues. On the other hand, a
government needs to shorten, as much as possible, any period of exclusivity
so as to promote greater efficiency and higher quality of services that
competitive entry would carry. In order to project the capital required, an
investor must acquire clear and detailed information about how much
growth and the scope of services will be required by a government. Given
that capital required during the expansion and modernization is typically
huge, the investor may require that funds for further investments be
internally generated or borrowed from national or international capital
markets. To be sure, special attention must be paid to regulatory
restrictions, such as treatment of tariffs, that may affect the profitability of
a privatized company.1°6
As the prospective investor requires prompt and detailed information, a
small and well organized team can ensure success in managing the
privatization process. In addition, factors that may contribute to enhancing
the interest of the investor: (i) transparency, a process free from contingent
political intervention; and (ii) the establishment of proper procedures,
ranging from invitations to prequalify to the ultimate selection of an
operator. °1 7
2. ENTERPRISE CONSIDERATIONS
As investors pay close attention to the financial situations and
perspectives of the state-owned telecommunications enterprises,
governments usually will have to turn companies into viable businesses and
make them as attractive as possible10 8 before they are offered to investors.
Therefore, in addition to reorganizing the companies and restructuring the
capital, reforms must be made with respect to finances and operations and
debts must be rescheduled or assumed by the government. 1°9 Moreover, as
company viability will depend, to a large extent, upon the support of labor
forces, reforms also must be made to pension plans, employee benefits, the
106 See Grossas, supra note 92, at 415.
107 This procedures in general include: provision of sufficient data room information and analysis,
analysis of the salient laws of the country, reasonable timetable and criteria to prequalify, statement of terms
and conditions of the sale, offering statements, deadline and bidder proposal, bidder selection, negotiation
and execution of a concession agreement. See O'neill, supra note 86, at 390.
108 See Sonneschein and Yokopenic, supra note 78, at 347-48.
109 See Grossas, supra note 92, at 414.
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quality and attitude of the labor force, and organizational structures in
general. 110
A fair and competitive valuation of the company is essential for the
success of the privatization. As investments in the telecommunications
sector imply long-term commitments, valuation must be appropriate with
the risk of operating in a foreign developing country. The capital structure
established by the government must be clearly assessed by the investor to
know how much investment will be required, when and in what form,"'
what amount of control the investors will have over the operation of the
company, and how the balance of the company's stock will be
distributed." 
2
V. THE STRATEGIC TOOL OF TELEFONICA IN PRIVATIZED LATIN
AMERICAN TOS: THE INTERNATIONAL CONSORTIUM
Once the suitability of making a FDI within the framework of a
consortium is accepted, a MTO must begin the search for adequate
partners. The consortium formalizes its relationship in a manner parallel to
the due diligence and negotiations involved during the bidding process. A
number of issues regarding inter-partner relationships and consortium-
government negotiations are critical for a successful consortium.
Throughout this process, as during the evaluation of the FDI assessment,
appropriate local counsel is critical to enhance the chances of success.
A. Main Characteristics of the Formation of a Consortium
An international consortium in the telecommunications sector may be
defined as a business cooperation process regulated by a contractual
relationship between the parties. In principle, an international consortium
is established for an unlimited time span. During such time, at least one of
the agents involved with or for the consortium is a telecommunications
operator. The agent's aim is to undertake a far-reaching business
telecommunications project requiring important financial and technological
contributions and resources to be provided by partners of the consortium.
The consortium must be governed by a joint organization established
110 See Sonnenschein and Yokopenic, supra note 78, at 348.
II Debt-equity swaps arrangements can facilitate the investment, as they result on an indirect price
discount on the assets. This low-cost investment approach was successfully used for instance in Argentina,
together with an additional cash payment. The rules established by the government were essentially: a
minimum of $214 million in cash, $380 million in Argentine foreign debt payable over a three-year period,
plus additional debt subject to a floor. See Odle, supra note 100, at 25; see also Petrazzini, supra note 16, at
127.
112 See O'neill, supra note 86, at 389.
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beforehand by the parties that is differentiated from the parties
themselves.' 13 Given that many parties are involved in the formation of a
consortium, what follows is a discussion focusing on the importance of
partner selection and contract formation.
1. SELECTING ADEQUATE PARTNERS
It is essential that the goals of all partners coincide or complement each
other. ' 4 Usually, five main parties are involved in the setting up of a
consortium in a basic telephone network or mobile telecommunications: (i)
a telecommunications operator leading the consortium; (ii) another
operator(s); (iii) financial partners; (iv) local partners; and (v) the local
government.1 5 While only the first four are members of the consortium, the
non-member government usually plays a decisive role.
The leading operator will carry the weight in forming the consortium.
This operator will be responsible for managing the business of the local
operator and will provide financial resources, technology, human
resources,116 and business capability. In addition, as the principal partner of
the consortium, the leading operator will assume responsibility for financial
control and management, for carrying out negotiations with local political
authorities and for settling possible conflicts that may arise between the
alliance's partners.
The role that other operators, if any, will play in the consortium is
similar to that of the leading operator, though some important differences
exist. These other operators search for new markets, gain experience in
operating certain services, and collaborate with leading operators in
business management." 7 They also must contribute resources, provide
113 See DurAn and Gallardo, supra note 72, at 97.
114 For instance, in Venezuela, GTE formed a consortium that included Telef6nica, AT&T and two
local partners (Banco Mercantil and Electricidad de Caracas). Telef6nica's experience in managing both
sophisticated data networks in rural communities was very valuable, especially during the period of intense
network developing. AT&T gave its experience in the development of the international traffic sector. The
local partners brought knowledge of the local financial and labor markets. Banco Mercantil, one of the
largest banks in Venezuela, brought knowledge of local cash flow management, local capital and consumer
markets, and advertising. Electricidad de Caracas, the private power company, brought its experience in
outside plant construction, local subcontractors, subcontract arrangements, and the local labor market.
These areas of knowledge were critical to GTE in meeting the expansion requirements of CANTV during
the first year. See Sonnesnchein and Yokopenic, supra note 78, at 359; see also, Durdn and Gallardo, supra
note 72, at 98.
115 See DufAn and Gallardo, supra note 72, at 98-99.
116 In 1995, Telefnica had 153 employees in Latin America: 45.1% in Argentina, 35% in Peru,
13% in Venezuela, 5.2% in Chile, and 1.7% in other countries. See Telef6nica Internacional, supra note 68,
at 16.
117 ROB FRIEDEN, INTERNATIONAL TW MMUNICATIONS HANDBOOK, 280,285 (1996).
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access for their own customers or know-how that compensates for the
principal operator's weaknesses, and exercise some lesser control.
If there are local or non-local financial partners, 1 8 their priority will be
to obtain an acceptable financial return against capital costs. A financial
partner does not participate in running the local operator's business, but
may collaborate in providing access to financial markets. To be sure, the
control exercised by non-local financial partners stems from the
relationship within the consortium.
Selection of local non-financial partners"19 capable of contributing to
the management of a company is essential. In most cases, the main goal of
non-financial partners is to pursue profit from their own business. This
profit-seeking role exists either because non-financial partners have
interests in the supply of goods or services available to the operator or
because they are needy consumers of telecommunications services. Special
care must be taken in selecting local partners because, apart from financial
resources, local partners can help the operator provide internal contacts and
knowledge of critically important local markets.'
20
Though it does not participate as a partner, the government plays a
fundamental role in a consortium's operation. Typically, when an
international consortium takes out a share in a basic network operator, this
involves at least partial privatization of the local operator. As a result, the
principal agent negotiating with the consortium will be the local
government. Given the strategic nature of the telecommunications sector,
the Government's negotiating position will be to defend national interests
related to the country's economic development. As for consortiums whose
118 In fact, large firms operating in the cash-rich telecommunications sector, have usually little
problem finding long-term financing, and often 50% or more of the required financing comes through
retained earnings. Usually a number of local and/or non-local banks provide further financing by being part
of the consortium. Having local financial partners ensures access to the local financial markets. A well
established consortium with a strong leading operator, by enhancing the credibilty of the privatized
companies, also ensures the confidence of lenders in the international financial markets where otherwise
unfavorable credit risk would have made them more reluctant. For instance, Argentina's TASA and Chile's
CTC have recently, subscribed syndicated loans, with very favorable interest rates, for a total amount of
$375 million from banks such as Deutsche Bank Argentina, Socidtd CAndrale and Santander Investment
Bank. See Jos6 Luis Guasch, Infrastructure Concession Design and Financing Issues, in PRIVATIZING
MONOPOLIES: LESSONS FROM THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORT SECTORS IN LATIN AMERICA
374-75 (Ravi Ramamurti ed., 1996); see also Christopher J. Sozzi, Project Finance and Facilitating
Telecommunications Infrastructure Development in Newly-Industrializing Countries, 12 COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L J. 447 (1996); see also LATIN FIN., June 1995, at 75; see also Telef6nica Intemacional,
supra note 68, at 47.
119 In Mexico, for instance, the government required that local partners were included in the
consortium.
120 See Telef6nica, La Experiencia de Teleftnica en Analrica Latina, Nov. 1996, at 7-8 [hereinafter
Telef6nica].
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aim is to participate in mobile communications networks, the Government
similarly plays a relevant role because it must grant the license for
operating mobile service, either on a monopoly basis or with limited
competition.
2. FORMALIZATION OF THE CONSORTIUM CONTRACT
A partnership agreement 12 1 should be established before a shareholders
agreement. Establishment of a partnership agreement helps to produce an
association of different members of the consortium in negotiation. Such an
association or agreement resolves important aspects of consortium
formation such as the percentage of each member's participation,
mechanisms for the decision-making, capital contributions and the covering
of expenses'until consortium formalization, and the prospective and
potential distribution of functions of each participant. The consortium, once
established, must submit a specific tender to the local Government's bid
request on the basis of a share package that will entitle it to manage the
operator.
122
The definitive consortium often takes shape after the license is
obtained.123 Once the partners are assembled, the consortium's
organizational structure must be defined clearly and must be provided with
a personality independent of its component parts.
Almost all alliances are created with unlimited time span. However, as
problems may arise among the consortium members regarding, among
other reasons, operating inflexibility, managerial conflicts, politicization,
reluctance by some partners to reinvest profits, and/or changes in the
political atmosphere, one or more of the partners may be willing to
withdraw from the consortium. 12 It is therefore advisable that the contract
regulating the consortium include an implicit sales option covering the
121 See Luis L6pez-van Dam Lorenzo, Aspectos jurdicos de las privatizaciones y adquisiciones de
empresas de telecomunicaciones en el exterior, in Cremades at 1105 [hereinafter L6pez-van Dam].
122 For the government's considerations on this issue see for instance, Hector A. Mairal, Legal and
Other Issues in Privatizations: the Argentine Experience, in OECD, PRIVATIATION IN ASIA, EUROPE
AND LATIN AMERICA, (1996), at 138-39.
123 For instance, in Argentina, the consortium was initially composed by Telef6nica, Citicorp and
Technint (an Argentine investment group). Once the tender was awarded, the structure of the consortium
was completed and new financial partners entered (Banco Hispanoamericano, Banco Rfo, Banco Comercial
de la Plata, Aresbank, Banco Central, Chemical Bank, etc.).
124 For instance, in Argentina, after buying participations of other financial partners in the
consortium Cointel, Telef6nica increased its participation from 10% to 29% in 1993. In August 1994
another increase on Telefonica's participation took place through the exchange of 20% of Chile's ENTEL
by 4.3% participation of Chemical Bank in Cointel. See Durdn and Gallardo, La internacionalizaci6n de
Telef6nica de Espatui Una estrategia multidomdstica con orientaci6n global, in MULTINACIONAIS
ESPAROLAS L ALGUNOS CASOS RELEVANTES 113-14 (Juan Jos6 Durdn ed., 1996).
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negotiated departure of one of the partners, 25 and stipulate that the
operator acting as leader (the MTO) be first in line to make the purchase.
The degree of participation in the management of the consortium's
capital is also a matter of great importance.' 26 Obtaining management
control can be critical for the purpose of complying with concession
mandates. When participation in the capital is majority in absolute terms,
the lead investor will have guaranteed majority in the organs of
representation (shareholders assembly) and in the administrative organs
(board of directors), thereby ensuring management and administration
control. If participation is not majority in absolute terms it might
nevertheless be de facto by demanding to change the percentage of shares
necessary to obtain majority control. Although minority participation and
atomized capital is usually the rule in Latin American telecommunications
privatization processes,127 the lead investor usually can have in practice a
relative majority to control the consortium. It is therefore important in this
latter case to establish legal mechanism through which the lead investor,
although holding a minority of shares, could retain control. A formula
commonly used is the establishment of series of shares conferring different
powers upon each of them.1
Other covenants to be carefully assessed and also included in the
shareholders agreement or statutes deal with the powers exercised in the
different organs of the consortium, mainly regarding the shareholders
assembly, the collegiate organs of administration, and the management
posts. 29 In this regard it is important to carefully provide for clear and
detailed procedures with respect to the requirements for regular meetings
(method of notice, quorum, and right to appoint substitutes), matters
requiring majority or super-majority votes, and nomination and revocation
of the managerial posts. 3'
Management contracts, linked to the position of shareholder, can also
be a critical element for strategic investors to obtain share control not
125 See Durfn, supra note 72, at 100. For an analysis of clauses usually found in partnership
agreements and sample clauses see generally RONALD F. SULLIVAN, FINANCING TRANSNATIONAL
PROJECTS, § 8.02 (1993) [hereinafter SULLIVAN].
126 See L46pez-van Dam, supra note 121, at 1105-06.
127 See VUYLSTEKE, supra note 1, at 121-22.
128 See Ldpez-van Dam, supra note 121, at 1106. For instance, in Venezuela four categories of
shares were established: class A belonging to the consortium, class B belonging to the State, class C
targeted on employees, and class D sold to the general public. Until January 2001, the CANTV's president
and four directors, as well as their deputies, were to be named by the owners of class A shares, and two
directors and their deputies were to be named by the owners of the majority of class B shares. See Franc6s,
supra note 15, at 161.
129 See L6pez-van Dam, supra note 121, at 1107.
130 See Sullivan, supra note 125, at § 8.02(3).
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obtainable by means of capital outlay.' 3' This formula is commonly used in
some privatization process and is of special importance in privatization
models where share capital is widely distributed. As in practice, the
strategic investor (the MTO) gives more input to the management of the
company than the rest of the shareholders, in the absence of a management
contract all shareholders would obtain, on the basis of participation, the
same return by means of dividends.
By the same token, the existence of legal limitations derived from
either privatization or business laws applicable disable in occasions that
operational control of the privatized entity could remain, by statutory
means, in the hands of the strategic investor. To overcome this potential
caveat, a management contract confers the strategic investor the possibility
of obtaining a greater return compared with the return which would result
from its participation in the privatized company.132
B. Acquisition Procedure: The Bidding Process
Just as a successful consortium depends on good selection of the
partners, so too does it depend on a transparent and fair bidding process as
well as managed negotiations with the government.
1. TRANSPARENCY AND NEGOTIATIONS
As already seen, most Latin American privatization processes follow
the strategic partnership model. To the extent that the goal is the
acquisition of capital and management capability, governments usually
impose prequalification requirements 33 in order for MTOs to submit a
specific tender. The bidding process therefore should provide for enough
time for comprehensive due diligence visits, outline clear criteria for
evaluating the bids, and provide disclosure of the final purchase price and
the buyer. Successful biddings must be transparent and competitive and
contain realistic deadlines and prices. 134 A single authorized government
representative or, better, the creation of a professional regulatory agency
131 See Lrpez-van Dam, supra note 121,at 1108.
132 Most of management contracts are linked, in return, to the maintaining of the title of concession
and are dependent upon the accomplishment of certain operational and financial conditions. Id. at 1108.
133 The elaboration of appropriated documentation regarding operational and financial capability
and other formalities required to prequalify need special consideration and thus requires local counsel to
ensure that all documents accomplish the required specifications. In the case of Spain, for every private or
public document to be valid and fully applicable in other country, it has to be legalize by notary public and
be authenticated by the consulate of the concerned country in Spain. In addition, some further formalities
may be also usually carried out in the concerned country, normally before the Foreign Affairs Ministry. Id.
at 1103.
134 See Sonneschein and Yokopenic, supra note 78, at 351-53.
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vested with authority (but separated from the political process) helps to
eliminate incertitude and enhance investor confidence in the process.
Various documents negotiated during the privatization process explain
in detail the terms, schedules and conditions of future operations. These
documents usually include a charter ("pliegos"), a license or concession
agreement, and the regulatory rules. The concession establishes the right of
a company to conduct a specific business, the terms and conditions under
which a company will operate, the terms and conditions for interconnection
requirements, and a company's obligations with respect to the networks
and to customer service. In comparison, the regulatory rules establish the
extent to which a business will be subject to competition, outline the period
of exclusivity, and present the methods for determining future rates and
rate increases. As the concession can change an investor's perception of a
company's value, bidders must discuss and negotiate these issues while
conducting due diligence review. In addition, any changes in it must be
agreed upon by a company and the government as stability in the
concession is critical for the investor.
Competition and exclusivity (e.g., investor's protection from open
competition) are critically important in allowing an investor to develop
basic network infrastructure and to provide services at reasonable prices.
35
Similarly, the ability to negotiate the local rate and the flexibility to make
price changes ensures a company's financial viability, provides for
economic incentives to increase operational productivity, and promotes
greater competition.136
Finally, as the costs associated with service requirements mandated in a
concession have a considerable impact on an investor's valuation of the
company, the bidders must check whether these services are realistic.
135 For instance, the concession contract of Telef6nica in CTC will expire by 2031, in Telef6nica
del Peri in 2013 (with possibility of extension), in CANTV by 2026 (with possible extension), and in
TASA is with unlimited time. Whereas local and long-distance services are already in competition in CTC,
the exclusivity period for both services expires in TASA in November 1997 (plus automatic extension of
three years if concession mandates are accomplished), in Telef6nica del Perd in June 1999 (plus possible
extension of five years), and in CANTV in September 2000 (plus possible extension of nine years). See
Telef6nica Intemacional, supra note 68, at 18.
136 A price ceiling regulation, providing for service baskets, adjustments for inflation and the rule of
maximum price adjustments, allows rationalization of prices in alignment with costs. Under this framework,
the growth of gross revenues will depend on the growth of subscribers base, productivity increases, and the
price elasticity of demand. Therefore, allowing the company operators to benefit by productivity increases,
which will be shared with consumers, will provide economic incentives and financial viability, which is
necessary to prepare for open competition. See Sonnenschein and Yokopenic, supra note 78, at 355. The
inflation adjustment are made every six months in TASA and every three months in Telef6nica Peru and
CANTV, and tariff revision are carried out each five years in CTC, annually in TASA and CANTV, and
freely readjusted by the consortium until 1998 in Teleftnica del Peru. See Telef6nica Intemacional, supra
note 68, at 18.
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2. DUE DILIGENCE AND CONTROL
Before making any offer to a government's bid request, an investor
must evaluate the changes required in a targeted privatizing company and
the cost of making such changes. This process, called due diligence, entails
a review of the information memorandum provided to all qualified bidders
and a thoughtful legal audit of the company. 137 Several important aspects to
be considered include: records of lines and subscribers, operation records
and service indicators, financial records, systems, billing and customer
service operations and access to business offices, supply and inventory
systems and access to warehouses, operation systems and access to
operation facilities, and the labor force situation. 3 8 Special attention must
be paid to any aspect subject to modification due to changes in the
ownership of a privatized company, such as loans and credits./39 To ensure
that the process is fair and open to all bidders, the process is usually
monitored either by the government or by a special office created for this
purpose;'4 even an engaged investment banker can act as the government's
agent.'
41
Once a government makes official the winning bidder consortium (a
fact that usually will depend not only on the financial contribution but also
on the prestige of the MTO and the combination of partners within the
consortium), | 42 a MTO's management of the local operator is ensured
through a variety of controls. On the one hand, a MTO's own
management will control thoroughly the management procedures
implemented in the local operator with respect to obtaining financial
returns, managing ethics, and fulfilling other strategic objectives. On the
other hand, the other consortium partners will make sure that they obtain
financial returns on their investments. Finally, the local government will be
more interested in political control and compliance with market regulations
in order to improve constantly the country's economic and social
conditions.
137 See Lpez-van Dam, supra note 121, at 1102-03.
138 See Sonnenschein and Yokopenic, supra note 78, at 356-57.
139 Although it is advisable to make the bidding offer dependable on government's settling of these
issues, in the case the procedure did not provide for a conditioned offer, a government's commitment to
resolve these contingencies before the deadline to present the bid or before the taking over of the privatized
company should be obtained. See LUpez-van Dam, supra note 121, at 1104.
140 As in Argentina.
141 As in Mexico and Venezuela.
142 See Durtin and Gallardo, supra note 72, at 98.
143 Id. at 99.
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C. Critical Factors of Success
In addition to selecting adequate partners and running a business
properly, the successful formation of a consortium among a number of
firms depends upon the relations and interests of various parties and upon a
number of issues the partners must approach during the alliance
establishment and negotiation stage.
The business conducted by an alliance must permit the exploitation of
the dominant partner's proprietary competitive advantages,' which in
essence are technological or managerial skills and know-how. Similarly,
the business must allow for a fluid flow of communication between and
among partners, a clearly defined framework of committed resources, a
definite mechanism for recovering them, and a profit sharing scheme or
formula. It is, moreover, indispensable that services be provided with
acceptable quality; otherwise expulsion- from the market would result and
the global strategy of a MTO jeopardized. 45 In addition, it is essential to
carry out good negotiations with the government. Although it will require
commitments in terms of service extension and quality and speed in
addressing demand, it will ensure private control of the company.
Negotiation also will enable a MTO to obtain commitments from a
government regarding, for instance, subsidizing of unprofitable activities
(such as extending the telephone service to rural areas),'6 extension of tax
exemptions, construction of a stable billing framework, and limitation of
country risk.
Inasmuch as profitable business is heavily reliant upon the level of
operating costs, it is important to eliminate managerial inefficiencies in
areas such as purchasing, personnel, and investment policies.'47 To this
end, appropriate local partners are, once more, of great importance. Also,
for the purpose of eliminating incertitude, it would be very useful for a
consortium to have previously established a telecommunications plan
covering the longest possible time span.
144 See Durfn and Gallardo 2. supra note 77, at 449.
145 It also can be a springboard to gain government's confidence when bidding for licenses in
cellular communications, as was the case in Argentina and the awarding of the second cellular telephone
license for the Buenos Aires area.
146 Such a subsidies for rural services are currently under-way, for instance in Peru, Paraguay and
Bolivia.
147 See Durdn and Gallardo 2, supra note 77, at 449.
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V1. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN
LATIN AMERICA
A. Globalization, Regional Integration and Direct Investment Flows
Toward Latin America's Telecommunications Sector
One of the most important illustrations of globalization in recent years
is the growing number of business intemationalizations. 14  Multilateral
liberalization efforts carried out under the GATT/WTO framework 149
combined with complementary efforts under regional integration agree-
ments have shot up the figures of international trade'50 and FDI. 15 The
combination of improved records of economic and political stability, the
success of open schemes of integration yielding a dynamic liberalization of
cross-border markets, and the continued growth of FDI during the last
decade,152 collectively, have made Latin America the second-fastest grow-
ing region in the world. The more integrated Latin American economies
become,' 53 the more FDI they attract and the more intra-region FDI rises,
148 The degree of economic globalization and inter-dependence is determined by advances in
factors such as: international trade, capital and investments flow, and technology transfers; patterns of
production and labor migration; the level of international economic cooperation; and intra-firm
organizational structures. See IRELA/IDB, supra note 85, at 4. For an analysis of FDI and globalization see
e.g. Richard J. Sweeney, The International Competition for Investment, in Oxelheim, 71-107.
149 In addition to providing a framework to reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, of
paramount importance is the new WTO Telecommunications Agreement reached in February 15, 1997.
This agreement will accelerate the global trend toward increased market access, competition, and
deregulation. For a brief analysis of its significance see e.g., Peter Sisson, The New WTO Telecom
Agreement: Opportunities and Challenges, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, Sept. 1997, at 24-33. In this regard, of
no less importance is also the work developed under the framework of the OECD to establish an agreement
on multilateral rules on investment. See Durdn, supra note 74.
15o During 1995, the increase in terms of international trade was three times quicker than that of
production. See THE ECON. RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS Div. AND THE STATISTICS AND INFO. SYS. DIV.,
WTO), INTERNATIONAL TRADE: TRENDS AND STATISTICS, 2 (1995).
151 In the last ten years the estimated value of annual global FDI outflows has increased from $60
billion to $315 billion, and during 1995 FDI outflows grew more rapidly than world trade. WTO, TRADE
AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 52 (1996).
1s2 FDI has continued to grow steadily from $8 billion in the late-1980 to $25 billion in the mid-
1990s. See LATIN FIN., June 1995, at 24. For instance, in 1994, Peru had a GDP growth of 12.7%, the
highest in the world.
153 Through a well established economic cooperation and the long-standing political dialogue with
Latin America, the EU has played a very important role, first, in the process of integration among Latin
American countries and, then, on the setting up of a new bi-regonal context between the EU and the most
dynamic, integrated and performing economies of the region, namely, Mercosur, Chile and Mexico. For an
analysis of the new commercial policy of the EU toward Latin America, the reasons, the targets, the
instruments, and trade and investment trends see Gonzalo Garcfa Jimdnez, New EU Trade Agreements With
Emerging Regions. The New Commercial Strategy of the EU Toward Latin America: In Search of Market
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the more intra-regional trade increases, the more the region's GDP
grows, 54 the greater consumer demand becomes, and, as a result, the grea-
ter the expansion of business is. As a natural consequence of this trend, ad-
vanced telecommunications services are in greater need. How well and how
fast Latin America adapts its telecommunications sector plays a pivotal role
in how quickly it will become competitive in the global marketplace.
There is a close relationship between economic development, in terms
of GDP per capita, and telecommunications development, in terms of lines
per 100 inhabitants (i.e., coverage). 55 The GDP per capita of certain
developing countries in Latin America reflects potential development in the
telecommunications sector and highlights a need and capacity to absorb
investment. When comparing the fastest growing regions in the world in
terms of GDP in recent years, vast differences appear between southeast
Asia and Latin America in terms of telecommunications coverage. Whereas
all southeast Asian countries are mature markets with acceptable levels of
demand in terms of coverage (e.g., over 30%), 1 ' Latin American countries
have coverage levels below 10%. This low coverage is, nevertheless, a
positive indicator inasmuch it reflects a potential telecommunications
market that must be served.
B. Spanish Investment Strategies and Trends in Privatized
Telecommunications Companies
From early efforts of privatization of state-owned TOs in Latin
American countries begun in the late- 1980s, Telef6nica has made important
investments in privatized telecommunications companies. All these
investments are made through a Telef6nica subsidiary, Telef6nica
Internacional Sociedad An6nima ("TISA"). TISA controls participation in
TOs and acts abroad with Latin America as a priority area for its long-term
expansion plans. 157 The goal of Telef6nica's internationalization strategy in
Access Trough a Regional and Specific Approach, in REGIONALISM AND MULTIIATERAISM AFTER THE
URUGUAY ROUND: CONVERGENCE, DIVERGENCE AND INTERACnION, 265-95 (Paul Demaret, Jean-Franqois
Bellis & Gonzalo Garcia Jimdnez eds., 1997).
154 Of an average 4.6 for the next years. See Latin Trade, Oct. 1997, at 46.
15 See lgnacio Santillana, Investing in Major New Infrastructure Projects, in IDB and
International Herald Tribune, LATIN AMERICA: A NEW INvEsTMENT PARTNER How TO REAP THE
DIVIDENDS OF THE REGION'S ECONOMIC REVIVAL, 75 (1994).
156 See generally Stephen McClelland et al., Asia: The Global Telecom Dynamo,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS, Sept. 1997, at 42-60.
157 Today fully privatized, at the beginning of 1996 Telef6ica owned 75% of the capital ($980
million) , and the Spanish State 23.8%. See Telef6nica Internacional, supra note 68, at 14. TISA also
operates cellular licenses in Romania (60% of Telef6nica Romania) and Portugal (15% of CONTACTEL).
See Telef6nica, supra note 68, at 37.
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Latin America is twofold: (i) to develop a multidomestic model through its
investments in the Latin American area; and (ii) to establish a presence in
those international projects aimed at providing global services to
multinationalized customers.
1. MULTI-DOMESTIC STRATEGY
Taking as a general framework geographic distribution, the general
pattern followed for purposes of analyzing Telefonica's investment expe-
rience in Latin America will be share participation and area of business.
Telef6nica's presence in Chile dates back to 1989 when it acquired
10% of Entel Chile, which provides international and long-distance
services. The investment was made, rather than through a consortium,
through a holding ("Inversiones Hispano Chilenas") fully owned by
Telef6nica1 58 By 1990 Telef6nica increased its share in Entel to 20%, but
had, later on, divested its interest in the company due to potential anti-
competitive practices. 159 In the same year, Telef6nica acquired 43.6% of
CTC from the Bond Corporation and held the shares in the holding
Telef6nica Internacional de Chile. Through CTC, 16° Telef6nica now
operated 95% of all Chile's basic telephone services. 16 By 1994, CTC
entered, through its subsidiary CTC Mundo, the liberalized long-distance
and international services market. In the same year, CTC acquired 80% of
Intercom, a Chilean enterprise operating cable television. 62 Telef6nica also
participated in mobile' 63 and data transmission services. Finally, Telef6nica
also participated in the yellow pages business through a 51% interest in a
company called Publiguias.' 64
"s8 See DurAn and Gallardo, supra note 125, at Il l.
159 By mid-1991, Chile's National Treasury Office pronounced sentence against the increase of
Telef6nica's share in ENTEL to 20%. The reason being that Telef6nica's dual share in both
telecommunications operators, CTC and ENTEL, would entail monopolistic practices in the fully
liberalized environment that the legislator was about to introduce. As a result, by mid-1994, Telef6nica
relinquished from ENTEL
160 Other partners are: Fondos de Pensiones Chilenos (21.6%), ADR'S (16.7%).
161 The other 5% corresponds to five regional companies.
162 Intercom merged in 1995 with Metropolis, a Chilean competitor in this market. The actual share
of Telef6nica in Intercom-Metropolis amounts to 30%. See Telef6nica Internacional, supra note 68, at 19.
163 This is achieved through a 45% participation in CTC-VTR Cellular (merged in mid-1996).
164 Other partners are: CTC (9%), Cochrane (20.4%), Publicar (19.6%).
SPANISH INVESTMENT STRATEGIES









*All telecommunications services in the southern
region through TASA. Cable TV throughout country
provided by Multicanal.
*All telecommunications services in the State of
Riogrande do Sul, except interstate and international
long distance.
*All telecommunications services trough CTC and
Publigufas.
*Cellular and value-added services through
COCELCO.
*Value-added services.
*All telecommunications services through Telef6nica
del Perd.
*Domestic and international long distance through
TLD.
*All telecommunications services through CANTV.
In Argentina, a consortium led by Telef6nica, Cointel, was awarded a
seven-year (extendible for another three years) concession to exploit as a
monopoly the telecommunications operator in Southern Argentina. With a
22% stake in TASA,"' Telef6nica operated basic telephone services in the
South of Argentina and in half of the area of Buenos Aires. International
and data transmission services were provided by Telintar and Startel,
respectively; both companies were equally half-owned by both by TASA
and Telecom Argentina (the Northern operator). Mobile communications in
the south were provided by the subsidiary TCP Cellular. In 1993, the
second cellular telephone license for Buenos Aires was awarded to
Movistar, a company equally half-owned by both TASA and Telecom
Argentina. Telef6nica also participated with a 25% stake in Sintelar,' 66 a
company dedicated to external plant equipment, provided services to big
customers through its participation in TYSSA, 167 and yellow pages services
through Pignas Doradas. In 1995, Telef6nica also acquired a 25% of
Multicanal to provide cable television services.
165 Other actual partners ae: Citicorp (15.5%), Techint (4.6%), Bco. Rio de la Plata (8.9%). See
supra notes 124 and 125.
166 Together, mainly, with the Spanish company Sintel.
167 Owned by Telef6nica (20%) and by TASA (80%).
168 Other partners are Citicorp Equity Investment (22.5%) and Grupo Clarfn (52.5%).
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Fondos de Pensiones Chilenos,
Grupo Luksic, grupo Claro (23.4%)
Citicorp (14.1%), Techint (4.2%),
Bco. Rio de la Plata (8.9%)
Peruvian State (29.3%), Grafia y
Montero (1.75%), Bco. Weisse
(1.75%)
GTE (20.4%), AT&T (2%),
Electric. de Caracas (6.4%),
Venezuelan State (49%)
Autoridad de Telfonos de Puerto
Rico (PRTA) (19%)
Grupo Sarmiento (50%), Grupo
Ardilla Lille (9.9%), CTC (9%)




Grupo Clarln (52.5%), Citicorp
Equity Investment (22.5%)
In Venezuela, the consortium Venworld acquired 40% of the capital of
CANTV. With a 20.4% ownership in the partially privatized company,
GTE, and to a lesser extent, Telef6nica (6.4%) and AT&T (2%), was in
charge of running basic telephone services, and local, national, and
international long-distance calls. 69 The consortium also provided value-
added services through CANTV Servicios, and has, since 1992, a second
cellular license by which services have been provided through Movilnet. It
also operated yellow pages business through Caveguias, and cable
television through CATV.1
0
In December 1992, Telef6nica acquired 79% of Telef6nica Larga
Distancia ("TLD") of Puerto Rico. It provided international service to more
than 40% of the country.' With TLD, Telef6nica gained access to the
advanced and dynamic North American market, and has been able, since
1996, to provide international services from the United States toward the
Latin American region.
19 Other partners in the consortium were: Electncidad de Caracas (6.4%), and the State (49%).
170 After some delay due to the limitation of 20% on the foreign capital participation fixed by the
Cable TV law, the license was recently granted.
171 The rest of the international traffic is provided by the US operators: AT&T, Sprint, and MCL
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In 1994, through a consortium mainly composed of local partners,
172
Telef6nica acquired 31.5% of Peruvian operators CPT and ENTEL, which,
in January 1995, became Telef6nica del Peri. Telef6nica provided basic
services, local, national, and international services, data transmission, and
mobile communications services. Cable television services were provided
through Cable Mdgico. As in Argentina, it also participated in SINTEL
Peru which was devoted to external plant equipment, a key activity in order
to accomplish the required extension of services.
In January 1994, Telef6nica obtained in Colombia, through a 30.8%
interest in the consortium COCELCO,173 a license to operate mobile
communications in the highly-populated northwest of Colombia, and a
license to provide value-added services.
In Mexico, in October 1995, Telef6nica reached an agreement with
GTE whereby the Spanish company acquired control of 25% of the.. .T • 174
consortium Unicorn.  As a result, Telef6nica, in addition to providing
value-added services in January 1996, entered the important Latin
American market of long-distance services, 175 currently undergoing a
period of liberalization. 176 Indicative of the importance of the Mexican
market, Unicorn and Alestra (composed by AT&T and the Mexican Grupo
Alfa) merged at the end of 1996. Not willing to lose an opportunity to
enter the Mexican market, Telef6nica negotiated its participation in
Avantel, a consortium composed by MCI and Banamex, a local financial
group.
In January 1997, following the first attempts of Brazil's de-
monopolization of the telecommunications sector, Telef6nica acquired
172 Grafia y Montero (1.75%), Banco Weisse (1.75%) and the State (29.3%).
173 Other partners in the latter are: Grupo Sarmiento (50.01%), Grupo Ardila Lille (9.9%) and CrC
Perti (9%).
174 Once Telef6nica entered the composition of Unicorn is as follows: GTE (25%), Telef6nica
(25%), and the local financial group Bancomer and Valores Industriales (50%).
175 It accounts for half of international traffic between Latin America and the US, and amounted to
$4 billion in 1996.
176 The newcomers, will enter the market in two stages. The first, in 1997, is the core triangle
formed by Mexico city-Puebla, Guadalajara and Monterrey, the area which accounts for about 70% of all
telephone traffic. Second, the rest (some 50 cities), for which they must provide services by the year 2001.
See Telecommunications in Latin America: How the Region is Wiring Up?, LATIN AMERICAN SPECIAL
REPORTS, August 1997, at 9 [see LATIN AMERICAN SPECIAL REPORTS].
177 By merging, Alestra and Unicorn will avoid the need to build to competing national fibre-optic
networks (each 3,600-mile network would have cost an average of $300 millions to build). Therefore, by
joining forces, the companies have saved at least that much, while allowing the consortiums to invest in
other telecommunications opportunities, such as wireless local telephone service (which, although the radio
frequencies required to operate the systems have to be yet auctioned by the government, the service is not
under exclusive concession to Telmex), and the communication satellite sector which will be soon
privatized. See generally, Bus. LATIN AM., Apr. 29, 1996, at 3.
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control of Companhia Riograndense de Telecomunicag6es ("CRT") in the
State of Rio Grande do Sul. 178 The importance of the CRT acquisition for
Telef6nica was clearly reflected in the price it paid for it: some $681
million for a 35% stake (55% higher that the minimum price). 179 However
exaggerated the price may seem, it was barely sufficient to beat the best bid
of Italy's STET.
2. GLOBAL STRATEGY
Telef6nica is the leading strategic investor of Latin American
telecommunications operators. It manages more than 9 million fixed lines
in service, more than 700,000 cellular subscribers, has a million cable
television customers, and globally, has more than 11 million customers. 18'
The company intends to expend $7 billion in expanding throughout Latin
America and, by the beginning of the next century, expects TISA's
acquisitions to account for half of its total earnings.
82
With its stake in Chile's CTC, Telef6nica Argentina, plus the Peruvian
and Brazilian acquisitions, the company now has a core structure from
which to launch its so-called "Pan-American Telecommunications
Network,"183 a scheme to provide a single-window service for international
traffic, cellular, data transmission, and cable television-multimedia first
within the axis Lima, Santiago, Buenos Aires and Porto Alegre, and then
expanded in the near future to the rest of Latin America. For this purpose,
the company intensified its actions on gaining the maximum profit from the
existent synergy's among the different affiliated companies. Mechanisms
for profit maximization include: favoring coordination and integration of
operations, setting up common purchase policies, establishing management
and information systems, and reducing financial operational costs. 1
178 CRT is the only company controlled by a state rather than the federal government. See BUS.
LATIN AM., Jan. 20, 1997, at 2.
179 Or $6,000 per line. Compare to $3,300 per lines of Chile's CTC.
1so See LATIN AMERICAN SPECIAL REPORTS, supra note 176, at 11 -12.
181 See Telef6nica, supra note 120, at 6.
182 Cf. with the current 15%. See Latin American Special Reports, supra note 177, at 12.
-183 The infrastructure for this regional network began to grow with the establishment of a land
connection between the Peruvian and Chilean telephone systems in 1995. The next important phase will be
the inauguration, expected for mid-1998, of the Americas I cable link running from Miami to Santiago,
passing through Brazil and Argentina. Apart from having affiliates along the cable's line, Telef6nica also
has a 12% stake in the cable link itself. Id. at 12.
184 For instance, for the period 1996-2000, through a coordinated purchase policy of Telefonica's
TOs in Chile, Argentina and Peru has an estimated cut expenses equivalent to $390 million. Likewise, an
integrated policy on services, information systems and products will represent savings in investments and
maintenance costs amounting up to $200 million. Finally, by being part of the Grupo Telef6nica
Internacional, the affiliated companies have better access to international capital markets (i.e., NYSE) and
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As a result, if Telef6nica's presence in the United States, through
TLD-Puerto Rico, represents a strategic link among Latin America, the
United States and Europe, penetration into Mexico's long-distance market,
and the recent expansion in Brazil's key market reinforce and consolidate
Telefonica's position as a global operator in Latin America. This
combination of factors makes the company become a strong, uni ue
interlocutor face to the large MTOs and consortia involved in the region.
C. Prospects for the Future: Existing Opportunities in the Region
In addition to recent strong growth resulting from a number of large
countries deregulating and privatizing, there is little doubt that the demand
in Latin America's telecommunication sector will continue to expand. 86 Of
an estimated $60 billion needed annually to fund necessary worldwide
telecom investments through 1999, one-sixth is reserved for Latin
America. 87  Setting aside Brazil, an estimated $80 billion in
telecommunications-related investment in the region will be needed over
the next five years.188
Infrastructure growth will require an estimated $16 billion a year for
the next five years. Brazil alone is estimated to require $40 billion worthy
of growth over the next three years. Although service penetration has
sharply increased it still requires a significant gap to fill: penetration
averages 9% for a 450 million population.189 Cellular telephony is another
improve credit ratings (CTC and TASA have recently subscribed syndicated loans amounting to $375
million with very favorable interest rates). See Telef6nica Intemacional, supra note 68, at 47-50; LATIN
FIN., Sept. 1995, at 75; see also Telef6nica Intemacional, supra note 68, at 27; see Telef6nica Internacional,
supra note 68, at 39.
185 See Telef6nica Internacional, supra note 68, at 28.
186 Deregulation, privatization and demand for cellular phones are boosting Latin America's
telecommunications sector. Brazil, Bolivia, Panama, Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Honduras, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Paraguay, and Uruguay are already carrying out privatization of their
telecommunications sectors. Others such as Mexico, Peru and Venezuela are further in the process of
liberalization. See Adam Thomson and Sally Bowen, Telecom Boom, LATIN TRADE, Oct. 1997, at 48-52.
167 Norman C. Lemer, Surveying the Market in Latin America, TELEcoMMUNICATIONS, Feb. 1997,
at 25.
188 See Jorge Perez Cantu and Leonardo Turolla, Getting Through to Latin America: What to
Expect in the Telecommunications Sector, LATIN FIN., at 12 [hereinafter Cantu and Turolla]. Likewise, the
value of the market will increase from $28 billion in 1996, to more than $40 billion by the year 2000; a leap
of almost 43%. See LATIN AMERICAN SPECIAL REPORTS, supra note 176, at 2.
189 Compare to a 56% penetration level in the EU and Canada and 52% in the US, for a 250 million
population in the EU and a combined 300 million for the US and Canada. Thus, whereas for instance
Mexico, with an 8.6% penetration level and a population of 90 million, has only 8 million lines, Brazil, with
150 million, has only 12 million lines and even lower penetration rate. See Cantu and Turolla, supra note
188, at 13. In absolute terms (number of lines installed) predictions of expansion in 1996-2000 are of 43%
in Peru, 38% in Colombia and Mexico, 37% in Venezuela, 33% in Chile, 26% in Brazil, and 21% in
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fast-expanding area of the market:'9 in the near future teledensity in the
seven largest economies is expected to increase from 1.5 to 4.2%.191 Plans
to double the network of communications satellites serving Latin America
are also under-way. 192 Expansion in the value-added services market' 93 and
the emergence of new telecommunications technologies, such as wireless
communications (e.g., personal communications services and pagers),
Internet,195 and video-conferencing, will require large high-technology
investments to address general and business consumer demand. As markets
liberalize, convergence of technologies such as telephony and cable, and
multimedia and wireless communications will present new challenges to
telecommunications companies throughout the region.
Although Brazil is the last major market in Latin America to embrace
reform of its huge telecommunications sector, the expectations and
Argentina. In relative terms (lines per population) predictions for the year 2000 implies expansion rates of
51% in Chile, 40% in Colombia, 21% in Peru, 20% in Brazil and 9% in Mexico and Venezuela. See LATIN
AMERICAN SPECIAL REPORTS, supra note 177, at 2.
190 For instance, by the end of 1994 there were approximately 2 million cellular subscribers,
compared to about 39,000 in 1990. See Arely Castell6n, Tapping the Market. Existing Opportunities in the
Region, LATIN FIN. supra note 34, at 17.
191 Chile, Argentina, Venezuela, Peru, and Brazil have already or are offering cellular licenses.
Although some times cellular systems are used to skip building digital line networks and thereby create an
artificial wireless growth rate due to cellulars' shorter start up time and lower initial costs, they should not
be seen as a quick fix for lack of penetration, as a fiber optic land system will be eventually be needed. See
Cantu and Turolla, supra note 188, at 14.
192 Private satellites service provision complement the capabilities of the basic wireline network and
provide additional transmission capabilities for other applications (such as very small aperture terminal
("VSAT'), and public switched network ("PSN") services). Satellites now carry out half of the region's
international telephone traffic, and grows at an annual rate of about 30%. Worldwide projects such as those
of Globalstar (a consortium formed by France T6ltcom, Alcatel and Hyundai) and Iridium (a group led by
Motorola) are also under strong competition to capture cellular telephone bands in the region. See LATIN
AMERICAN SPECIAL REPORTS, supra note 177, at 4; Mohsen Khalil, Argentine Company Launches
Satellite, INT'LFIN. CORP. REV., 15, 15-71 (1994).
193 Because the majority of telephone companies concentrated on extending the number of lines
available to consumers, only large multinational corporations that had created their own private networks
gained access to value-added services such as voice mail, "800" numbers, call forwarding and call waiting.
Thus the lack of services available to the general public, has created unique opportunities in this market.
See Cantu and Turolla, supra note 188, at 12.
194 See in general, Motorola, Frequencies of the Future. Wireless Communications Keep Latin
America in Touch, BUS. LATIN AM., at 18-23.
195 In Brazil, for instance, although there are about 500,000 users, market penetration is still low
(3%). Although some constraints still exist a fast expansion is under way: competition is already being
promoted to establish inter-linked cross-border networks, and connection costs will be eased through the
Arericas I fibre-optic cable. See LATIN AMERICAN SPECIAL REPORTS, supra note 177, at 5; Josd L.
Barletta, New Waves. Improved Technology Expands Internet, LATIN FIN., supra note 34, at 24-27.
196 On this issue see Picture Tel Corporation, Meeting the World Face-to-Face. Videoconferencing
Helps Latin Firms Conduct Business Globally, LATIN FIN., supra note 34, at 28-30.
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business prospects that privatization and liberalization entail are
unmatched. Brazil offers the most attractive telecommunications market in
the region because of its size (160 million people) and economic potential
(expected 4 to 6% growth through the end of the decade). Furthermore,
Brazil is also an attractive market because of the inadequacy, poor
performance and low penetration of the sector, whose improvement yields
to large profitable businesses for private investors.197 The core telephone
business alone will require about $70 billion worth of investment; before
the year 2003, the whole privatization process is expected to attract about
$100 billion.'9
Major players such as Telef6nica, STET, France T616com, GTE,
AT&T, Bell operating companies, as well as smaller investors groups are
already forming consortia with local partners'" to compete for Band 'B
'200
cellular concessions and for the privatization of Telebrfs2°' (the state
holding company that is to be split up into six units: five "Baby-Brds"
providing local services, and Embratel providing domestic long-distance
and international services). With its foothold in Brazil, Telef6nica has
ensured its role in the key to future Latin American telecommunications
markets.
197 The government's eight year plan for substantial growth by 2003 includes: increase in fixed
access lines from 14.3 million in 1995 to 40 million; increase in line density from under 9% to more than
24%; increase in cellular subscribers from 1.3 million in 1995 to 17.2 million; increase in pay TV
subscribers from 700,000 to 16.5 million. See Lerner, supra note 188, at 27-28.
198 See LATIN AMERICAN SPECIAL REPORTS, supra note 176, at 10- 11.
199 There is a limitation of 49% maximum ownership by foreign investors. For a description of
investment laws regarding the telecommunications sector see Walter D. Stuber and Marfa C. Semionato,
Investments in Telecominunications'in Brazil, 1 TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND SPACE J, 257-88 (1994).
200 Telebris has separated the cellular telephony market into Band "A" services (accounting for
60% of market growth), offered by the public sector, and Band "B" services (accounting for 40% of market
growth), to be offered to private investment under ten region-concessions. Bell South won the concession
for the city of Sto Paulo at more than four times the minimum price and the concession for the Northeastern
region (covering six states). In August, a consortium led by Swedish Telia won the bidding for a 15-year
concession of the interior of the State of Slo Paulo. See LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRY REPORTS: BRAZIL,
Sept. 1997, at 17.
201 The Brazilian Constitution was amended in 1995 to allow for the breakup of the state
telecommunications monopoly, Telebrds, and the first set of regulations were enacted in November 1995.
Telebrs is responsible for 92% of the local traffic and 100% of long-distance traffic in Brazil. The federal
government has 52.2% of Telebrds' voting capital and 3.76 of its non-voting capital, foreign investors own
28% of the capital. See Ian Katz, No More Busy Signals, LATIN TRADE, May/June 1996, at 77; Antonio C.
Mazzuco, Brazil Telecommunications Regulation, 2 COMPUTER AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS L REV. T-67
(1996).
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Vii. CONCLUDING REMARKS
With the reforms undertaken in Latin America's telecommunications
sector and successful privatization of telephone companies every one wins:
the government, the customer, the employees, the investors, and the
economy. Although governments, in order to attract investors, did not
transform state monopolies immediately after privatization into
competitive, privately-owned sectors in one swift step, they will achieve
the same final result via an intermediate stage of regulated private
monopoly. Potential investors will continue to be attracted by, among other
elements: popular and labor support, political and economic stability,
liberal foreign investment laws, constant economic growth, appropriate
sector and enterprise restructuring, clear regulatory frameworks, and a
transparent and fair process.
Telef6nica's experience in Latin America's telecommunications sector
serves as a model in that it presents a number of factors largely contributing
to MTOs' successful and profitable investments. Specifically, several
considerations or activities must be appreciated when considering the
alluring prospects the region offers. Preliminary evaluations of political
and economic risks and prospects of growth in telecommunications demand
should be conducted. An investor may also want to engage local legal
advisors with deep knowledge about the political, economic and legal
environments. An investor must be prepared to manage in a different
cultural environment. Potential investors also must identify positive
signals for entering the market, make suitable selection of partners and
make special considerations in gaining support of prestigious local
partners. Ultimately, an investor must select an activity that exploits the
competitive advantage of each operator and allow for the fluid and
trustworthy flow of communication between and among partners. At last,
an investor must conduct effective and continuous negotiation with the
partners and with the government, ensure appropriate human resources and
relations with unions, and provide high quality services. At a more general
level, internationalization has to be one of the essential strategies of a
MTO. A strong multidomestic strategy can enhance a global strategy and
allow a company to become a world leading telecommunications operator
and to gain access to otherwise closed markets.
Just as Spain's Telef6nica has become, through a multidomestic and
global strategy, the Latin America's leading telecommunications provider,
so too is another Spanish company, Empresa Nacional de Electricidad
Sociedad An6mina ("ENDESA"), well on its way to becoming the most
important strategic investor in the Latin American energy sector and the
leading provider, distributor, transporter, and generator of electricity in the
region. The pattern of behavior analyzed in this paper in the context of the
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telecommunications sector is, to some extent, similar to that currently
under way in both the European Union's and Latin America's energy
sector. On the one hand, liberalization of the EU's energy sector,
introduction of competition into the European market and privatization of
major Member States' national monopolies is opening the gate for them to
apply diversification strategies in other sectors (gas, water,
telecommunications) and international strategies to expand through
investments in emerging foreign markets. On the other hand, Latin
America's energy sector not only presents outstanding prospects for the
future (e.g., investment needs in the sector range from $10 billion to $25
billion annually, and electric demand is expected to grow 3% annually), but
also offers a market in which privatization is gaining momentum. As a
result, acquisitions of privatized state-owned energy companies, biddings,
strategic alliances and international consortia with important local
technological and financial partners will be multiplied in the upcoming
years. Recent investments of ENDESA, which began privatization of half
of the remaining state-owned 60% in October 1998 and devotes 60% of its
foreign investments to Latin America in Enersis of Chile, Colombia, Peru,
and Central America (through the Siepac project), evidence a process to
consolidate ENDESA's position as the leading strategic investor in the
region. ENDESA, moreover, maintains a view toward the creation of a
proposed large pan-American electric network. Doubtless, the Spanish
experience in the telecommunications sector will enhance the confidence
and the chances to -consolidate its presence in Latin America's energy
sector.
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